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ABSTRACT 
 
Although far-right politics remains a fringe movement in contemporary Germany, 
one can observe its continuing presence in society given the rise of the National Democratic 
Party (NPD) in the early 2000s, and the violent attacks led by the National Socialist 
Underground (NSU) from 2000-2006.  A divided opinion amongst Germans arises regarding 
how best to address nationalism: should the state mandate an outright ban on all nationalist 
groups, or foster a system that allows for close observation and monitoring of said groups?  
Nonetheless, the nuanced elements of the far-right movement make it increasingly difficult to 
achieve a definitive solution.  While encompassing less than 1% of the population, supporters 
of the far-right often possess distinctly cultural or political identities that compromise the 
overall efficacy and legitimacy of the movement.   
 
Given ambiguous rates of support due to these conflicting identities, as well as the 
isolation of right-wing groups and individuals in specific regions, how has the contemporary 
right-wing achieved such widespread publicity?  More importantly, to what degree does this 
movement pose a threat to German democracy?  In this thesis, I provide an interdisciplinary 
review of film (Dennis Gansel’s Die Welle), literature (Andres Veiel’s Der Kick and Timur 
Vermes’ Er ist wieder da), journalism, and government publications to identify the societal 
implications of the contemporary far-right in Germany.  Specifically, I seek to address how, 
if at all, these cultural representations of far-right ideology mirror the actual movement, and 
to what extent this movement may subvert established German democracy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Germany spent much of the 20th century entrenched in national change: years of 
transitioning governments, political controversy, and the drawing and redrawing of borders.  
Accordingly, these decades of political upheavals and repositioning left Germans with a 
lingering question of identity.  In a country that experienced fascism, communism, and 
democratic reunification all within 60 years, what does it mean to be German?  At what point 
do presentations of patriotism turn into nationalist zealotry?  During the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup, as host for the first time in over 30 years, Germany experienced an unrivaled resurgence 
of patriotism.  While soccer games and the success of the national team remained at the 
forefront of Germans’ minds, crowds singing the national anthem, windows swathed in the 
national flag, even Gummibärchen in den Farben der Nation1, proved to the world that 
Germans felt confident reclaiming their national identity. 
World Cup 2006 marked a publicly evident shift in German national identity, and 
many advocated for Germany’s newfound spirit as an example of “positive nationalism”2 or 
a more unverkrampft attitude.3  Conversely, more critical voices, such as former NPD 
watchdog blog Publikative.org, repudiate these claims, arguing instead that any form of 
nationalism should be viewed as a threat, and German patriotism in particular must be 
viewed with some degree of skepticism and caution.  Furthermore, Publikative.org maintains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Müller, Christoph, Adrian Oeser, and Maximillian Pichl. “Der Wahn Der Normalität.” Publikative.org.
 V.i.S.d.P.: Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 21 June 2010. Web. 23 Sept. 2013.
 <http://www.publikative.org/2010/06/21/der-wahn-der-normalitat/>. 
2 Neumayer, Ingo. "What Remains of the “Summer’s Tale”? Norbert Schütte on the Outcome of the 2006 
World Cup." Experiencing Germany - Panorama. Goethe Institut, July 2011. Web. 01 Oct. 2013.
 <http://www.goethe.de/ges/mol/del/pan/en7844705.htm>. 
3 Müller, Oeser, and Pichl. “Der Wahn Der Normalität.”  
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that because proponents of this new form of patriotism present it as “nett und unpolitisch,” 
the general public should be even more critical.4 
An arguable solution to this debate could be that World Cup 2006 should be viewed 
simply as an example of exuberant sport fandom void of any political commentary.5  
However, it cannot be ignored that Germany’s position as host of this particular World Cup 
tournament encouraged a prolonged and sustained display of patriotism for spectators.  
Viewers witnessed a genuinely changing mindset, not just a fleeting national identity crafted 
for a sporting event.  While Germany had previously been patriotic, the manner in which 
individual Germans expressed said patriotism varied greatly, and often faced inevitable 
criticism due to the brutal tradition of National Socialism.  World Cup 2006 spurred 
momentum for a transformation of national identity.  
But in a country with a longstanding aversion to political radicalism ever since the 
brutality of fascism under the Nazis, domestic terrorism during the leftist “Deutscher 
Herbst,” and the totalitarian regime in the German Democratic Republic, should Germans be 
so quick to dismiss the significance of public displays of patriotism?   
Ein positiver Bezug auf eine Nation, egal welche, ist immer negativ. Ein nationales Wir-
Gefühl braucht immer auch ein Feindbild. Die Soziologie spricht dabei von Inklusion und 
Exklusion, jede Bildung einer nationalen In-Group, bildet auch eine Out-Group, der 
Zusammenhang von Nationalismus und Rassismus ist unumstritten. Jeder positive Bezug auf 
eine Nation, braucht aber auch eine historische Basis und deshalb ist der deutsche 
Nationalismus speziell.6 
Given the numerous traditions of radicalism in Germany, skepticism of any form of 
overzealous or prideful collective identity may be grounds for concern for the German 
people.  Even if these identities do not initially possess a clear left- or right-wing orientation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Müller, Oeser, and Pichl, “Der Wahn der Normalität.” 
5 Neumayer, Ingo. "What Remains of the “Summer’s Tale”? Norbert Schütte on the Outcome of the 2006 
World Cup." Experiencing Germany - Panorama. Goethe Institut, E.V., July 2011. Web.  
24 Sept. 2013. <http://www.goethe.de/ges/mol/del/pan/en7844705.htm>. 
6 Müller, Oeser, and Pichl, “Der Wahn der Normalität.” 
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the sheer existence of ideology that may promote any form of in-group/out-group 
dynamics—including those favoring a national soccer team over another—should be 
avoided.  By these measures, patriotism can very easily fall into a state of radicalism.  
Although Germany has experienced the full spectrum of political radicalism, the 
population often pays particular attention towards right-wing and nationalist ideologies due 
to the experiences of World War II.  Since the early 2000s, right-wing radicalism, and in 
some cases extremism, has grown within the Federal Republic to reveal a minor, albeit 
present, voice of new nationalism.  As stated previously, overenthusiastic fandom creates a 
possible slippery slope of increasingly radical opinions.  In a sociological study conducted 
after the 2006 World Cup by the Universität Bielefeld, participants self-reported “Stolz auf 
die soziale Sicherheit” and “Stolz auf die Demokratie” in Germany; interestingly, the former 
decreased by 6.0 percent, while the latter increased by 11.5 percent.7    
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned political upheavals and repositioning of 20th 
century Germany stem largely from a fervent need, and desire, to develop out of fascism 
under National Socialism, and later totalitarian socialism in East Germany.  Given 
Germany’s immense political progress since reunification, a public response of increased 
support for German democracy seems appropriate.  However, a reduced pride in social 
security seems disconcerting given that it is precisely developed democracy that allows for 
systemic functions to provide soziale Sicherheit for its citizens.  Pride in democracy and 
social security should, theoretically, be relative to one another given their mutual 
codependence.  More importantly, expressed doubt of social security in Germany reflects 
overarching skepticism in the efficacy of a successful democratic government.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Horré, Nina. "Die Fahnen hoch?!?: Nationale Symbolik in der SPD." Vorwärts. Berliner Vorwärts
 Verlagsgesellschaft MbH, 17 Nov. 2010. Web. 5 Nov. 2013.
 <http://www.vorwaerts.de/artikel_archiv/26362/die-fahnen-hoch.html>. 
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Instances of national mistrust often result in critical shifts of a public’s political 
ideology.  Inevitably, periods in which the efficacy of a well-established system remain in 
question provide ample opportunity for populist ideology—that in any other context might 
seem farfetched—to garner increased support.  Within a German context, general distrust of 
the government, often resulting in perceived decrease in soziale Sicherheit, originates from 
radical right-wing groups portraying a societal ‘other’ (foreigners, citizens dependent upon 
social welfare, etc.) as the catalyst for compromising societal wellbeing by existing outside 
of the perceived national identity.   
With national pride reemerging in even the most mundane of situations, such as 
soccer games, it should be considered how and where these attitudes begin to develop.  
Although far right-wing politics remain a fringe movement in contemporary Germany, one 
can easily observe its increasing presence in society; consequently, the presence of such 
ideologies within the mainstream results in a divided opinion amongst Germans of how to 
address nationalism.  Often politically driven, this concern generally yields a twofold 
opinion: either support for outright banning of all nationalist groups, or favor of a system that 
allows for close observation and monitoring of said groups.  Undoubtedly, it remains 
evermore apparent that German society requires a broader, more holistic understanding of the 
origins, catalysts, and potential consequences of the contemporary far-right-wing movement 
in order to protect the established democracy of the Republic. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the broader understanding of the contemporary 
right-wing movement’s role in German politics and culture.  In Chapter One, I analyze the 
ways in which Dennis Gansel’s film Die Welle (2008) addresses the perceptions of radical 
behavior, and how contemporary nationalist identity has developed in Germany.  Gansel’s 
- 9 - 
film depicts the story of a high school teacher’s classroom experiment meant to teach 
students about political and societal organizing that ultimately devolves into a volatile 
pseudo-political movement.  The film also questions how authority, groupthink, and power 
structures can manipulate the way in which individuals function within a small group, and 
society as a whole.   
  In Chapter Two, I evaluate Andres Veiel’s Der Kick: ein Lehrstück über Gewalt 
(2008), an account of the murder of 16 year-old Marinus Schöberl’s death by neo-Nazis.  Der 
Kick provides readers with an excellent example of how right-wing individuals and groups 
manifest their identities in distinctly intellectual or physical capacities, thus creating a 
distinctly political or apolitical identity.  Similarly, the extreme events presented in Der Kick 
allow us to review the causes of radical behaviors, and further understand the larger societal 
implications thereof.  Accordingly, I detail the strained societal and economic resources of 
the community in which the murder occurred, and discuss the degree to which this 
community fosters radical right-wing invovelment. 
  In Chapter Three, I conclude and argue that contemporary nationalist identity bears 
some resemblance to Germany’s nationalist past under the NSDAP in World War II, despite 
extreme limitations of the NDP due to the Grundgesetz.  In an effort to further understand 
this resemblance, I contrast the real policy and experience of the Nationaldemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in contemporary Germany with the party’s fictional presence in 
Timur Vermes’ novel Er ist wieder da (2011).  Vermes’ satirical novel depicts a distinctive 
image of Hitler outside of a factual context and provides unique commentary theorizing 
Hitler’s potential opinions of contemporary nationalism.  
  Regardless of its form, the core concern of many Germans regarding contemporary 
- 10 - 
nationalism revolves around the manner in which this “new” nationalism can develop in 
present-day Germany.  Only since the late 1990s and early 2000s have the effects of right 
wing movements on German culture, and subsequently the German people, become evident.  
However, the question remains whether or not nationalist identities will continue to develop, 
and how popular German culture will engage with aspects of these identities in an effort to 
further define what it means to be German. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Discovering the Contemporary Significance of Radical Behavior in  
Dennis Gansel’s Die Welle (2008) 
 
In his 2008 film Die Welle, director Dennis Gansel explores the possible origins of 
contemporary nationalist attitudes.  Gansel’s film remains a work of fiction; however, his 
depiction of a classroom experiment testing the feasibility of reviving fascism proves that 
groupthink and radical groups remain ever powerful within present-day culture.  In a 2008 
interview, Gansel explained the motivation behind his film as proof that radical movements 
can occur anywhere—Germany is no exception. 
Wir beschreiben einfach die Schule, auf die wir selber gegangen sind. Und es gibt Charaktere 
im Film, mit denen ich selber zur Schule gegangen bin [...] Es kommen Lehrer vor, die wir 
gerne gehabt hätten und die, die wir hatten. Der Blick ins wahre Leben hat uns sehr geholfen. 
Und aus diesen Charakteren heraus haben wir dann die Geschichtentwickelt. So, wie wir uns 
das vorgestellt haben, welche Schritte wahrscheinlich gewesen wären und in sich logisch 
sind.8 
 
In the film, Rainer, an instructor at a suburban Gymnasium, directs students through a 
Projektwoche course on autocracy; more specifically, he poses a significant philosophical 
question to his students: could another dictatorship ever occur in modern Germany?  The 
question is undoubtedly highly political, and may seem like a farfetched conjecture; however, 
Gansel based Rainer’s classroom experiment off of a 1967 social experiment led by Ron 
Jones, a high-school teacher in Palo Alto, California.  Jones gained inspiration for his 
experiment from traditions of Nazism and challenged students to consider whether 
democracies could regress towards fascism. 9  Like in Die Welle, Jones’ students effectively 
crafted a movement defined by a clear in-group/out-group dynamic in which members of The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Vogel, Jürgen, Christian Becker, and Ron Jones. "Die Welle: Interviews." Interview.Filmering.at. Michael  
Föls, 24 Jan. 2008. Web. 15 Oct. 2013.. <http://www.filmering.at/special/2513-die-welle-interviews>. 
9 Jones, Ron. "The Third Wave, 1967: An Account - Ron Jones." The Third Wave, 1967: An Account – Ron 
Jones. Libcom.org, 24 Oct. 2008. Web. 18 Mar. 2014.  
<https://libcom.org/history/the-third-wave-1967-account-ron-jones>. 
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Third Wave flourished in the school’s framework, while non-members did not.  It seems that 
questions surrounding the fragility of democracy prove unavoidable in understanding 
national identity. 
While Gansel’s film remains a fictional account of a German classroom, it is 
important to note that the film serves as a litmus test for right-wing radicalism in Germany.  
In a 2011 interview, Gansel explained that the film resulted from weeks of research and one-
on-one interviews (approximately 50 in total) with current German school students at four 
schools in the north and south of Germany.10  He explains that 60-70 percent of the dialogue 
from and amongst students within the film came directly from the interviews conducted by 
him and other writers for the film and that, “The Wave is a German high school right now [;] 
it’s how they talk and how they behave.”11  Gansel’s own research for the film functions as 
fieldwork, much like Jones’ and Wenger’s experiments.  By conducting his own sociological 
study, Gansel offers a unique, albeit cautionary, opinion of contemporary German youth’s 
relationship with right-wing radicalism.  The film’s fictional account carefully treads a line 
where viewers see the feasibility of extreme ideology, and also recognize this presentation as 
a warning-sign. 
  Shortly into the film, Rainer addresses his classroom to begin their discussion on 
autocracy (0:11:30).  The scene proves important for this analysis given its idiosyncratic 
presentation of youth perspectives of autocratic ideology, specifically in a German context.  
Rainer asks his students to give an example of an autocratic group, only to face an anxious 
silence from his students; clearly, no one wished to mention the obvious example of Nazi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Gansel, Dennis. "EXCLUSIVE: Dennis Gansel Talks The Wave and We Are the Night." Interview by Brian
 Gallagher. MovieWeb. MovieWeb, 8 June 2011. Web. 15 Oct. 2013.
 <http://www.movieweb.com/news/exclusive-dennis-gansel-talks-the-wave-and-we-are-the-night>. 
11 Ibid. 
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Germany and the Third Reich.  Finally, a student mentions the aforementioned example, only 
to receive an incredulous response from Kevin, a bully who appears to have his own ‘gang’.  
Kevin incredulously states, “We get it… fuck the Nazis!” and argues that something like 
“that,” i.e. Nazi Germany, could never happen again (0:13:00).  Other students protest and 
cite neo-Nazis as proof that autocratic or nationalist groups can, in fact, function in 
democratic states.  Kevin responds arguing that individuals of the present day cannot 
continue to feel guilty about the Nazi past forever when it is not something with which they 
had any involvement.  Mona, an outspoken student with a left-leaning political orientation, 
states, “It’s not about guilt. It’s about historical responsibility” (0:13:35). 
  Although the discussion begins with Rainer asking general questions of what 
autocracy entails, the conversation quickly devolves into discussing how these groups 
function within a German society.  Rainer asks his students matter-of-factly whether or not a 
dictatorship, such as under the Third Reich, would be feasible within German society in the 
present age—his students answer in resounding opposition.  The students continue to discuss 
with Rainer what type of environments, or social problems, foster autocratic societies or 
groups to form.  Mona responds that national consciousness and pride (Nationalbewusstsein) 
tend to be strong indicators that autocratic communities can grow.  Although she and her 
classmates previously agreed that a dictatorship would not be feasible in Germany at the 
present time, she includes the reemergence of German flags at the 2006 World Cup in her 
commentary regarding national consciousness and pride (0:19:35).  While some of her 
classmates audibly agree with her, others, such as Sinan, a student of Turkish origin, 
disagree.  Sinan argues that Germans should embrace their ability to finally be proud of their 
country just like “everyone else” (0:21:06).  He further states that if this pride cannot occur, 
- 14 - 
then it simply leads to “reverse hatred of everyone else.” 
  As Mona, Sinan, and their classmates discuss the influence of World Cup 2006 the 
viewer is left to reflect on ‘real life’ experiences affiliated with the event.  Undoubtedly, 
Mona’s contrarian opinion of Germany’s display of patriotism during the World Cup reflects 
that of many Germans who, as stated previously, felt discomforted by omnipresent national 
colors and flags.  Conversely, Sinan represents a new type of German who embraces national 
identity not in negligence of the past, but in support of a new, democratic Germany.  The 
viewer cannot, however, discount the irony of Gansel’s presentation of Sinan, a second-
generation Turkish-German, as the image of new German patriotism.  But similar to Sinan, 
many Germans in 2006 viewed World Cup as a moment of national rebirth.  While Germans 
seemed reticent to overzealously display their patriotism, the desire remained to partake in 
the same fanfare and national pride typical of other populations during the World Cup.  Der 
Spiegel profiled Herbert Albrecht, an at-the-time 54 year-old resident of the Allgäu, who 
actively chooses to disassociate himself from the idea of “pride” during World Cup, but does 
not think “we should leave the ‘craziness’ to the Argentinians and Brazilians.”12  Both 
Albrecht and Sinan’s commentary force the viewer to more critically consider discussions 
surrounding World Cup and overt patriotism, specifically how citizens can separate relaxed 
national pride from fervent nationalism. 
  The debate about the 2006 World Cup amongst Wenger’s students draws the film out 
of the fictional realm, into the context of contemporary Germany.  Gansel’s use of current 
events not only provides the film with anecdotal commentary, but also relevance to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 "World Cup Identity: Trying to Be German as the World Watches." SPIEGEL ONLINE International.
 SPIEGEL ONLINE GmbH, 12 June 2006. Web. 01 Nov. 2013.
 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/world-cup-identity-trying-to-be-german-as-the-world 
 watches-a-421061-2.html>. 
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contemporary culture; moreover, the film allows Gansel to express his own commentary on 
pressing issues such as national identity and cultural influence.  Although the film clearly 
takes place in the present day, Gansel places the film within a very specific and concrete time 
frame—both culturally and politically—given the topics of conversation throughout the film 
(ex. World Cup 2006).  The students’ commentary removes the story from the realm of 
feature film, and places it in a documentary of every-day conversation and thought.   
 Already the viewer gains valuable insight into the way these students have been 
socialized to perceive pride in one’s country, nationalist behavior, and the sources of 
autocratic society.  It appeared initially that each student agreed that, simply put, autocracy is 
bad, and because of the country’s history, Germany could never experience such groups 
again.  However, as the conversation develops, and as Gansel slowly type casts each student, 
the viewer observes divergent opinions on how exactly these ideologies, i.e. autocratic and 
nationalistic, fit into contemporary society.   
 Rainer’s course slowly becomes more than just a conglomeration of students studying 
together, but rather a fully functioning social group.  As Rainer slowly implements specific 
rules for his class, the students begin to coalesce to form their own unified group.  Rainer 
encourages his students to embrace the importance of working together, claiming that 
individualism leads only to Social Darwinism (0:28:00-0:30:00).  The unity of the group rests 
on three core tenets: uniformity of appearance, identity, and ideology.  Accordingly, the 
students agree that individuals will identify as part of the group by wearing a white shirt for 
the duration of the project, thus signifying a unified ideology.  Similarly, Rainer encourages 
his students to embrace the mantra of “Macht durch Disziplin, Macht durch Gemeinschaft,” 
or “power through discipline, power through community” (0:30:00-
- 16 - 
students highlight that the group has grown so large due to other students joining the course, 
that they must have a name.  From thereon, the course participants are known as Die Welle. 
 It is important to note that through this collective organizing, the students have 
effectively transformed from only a collection of students taking a course together, to a full-
fledged social group with their own unique structure and expectations.  By creating a 
collective identity in the form of a common uniform, ideology, and recognizable moniker, the 
students have socially separated themselves from their peers outside of Die Welle.  From this 
point forward, the students proceed as a unified force, sacrificing the experience of the 
individual in favor of that which furthers the development of Die Welle.   
 The official declamation of Die Welle also marks the group’s use of exclusionary 
practices.  After leaving Rainer’s course for lack of willingness to conform, Karo is blatantly 
ostracized by her classmates, and viewed as enemy to the group.  Although she later 
campaigns against Die Welle, Karo’s initial rejection by her peers portrays her to be a 
figurative enemy of the state.  Soon Rainer’s students begin recruiting new members; 
however, the group quickly loses its academic focus, and focuses solely on its function as a 
social group.  Kevin, after arguing earlier that Germany’s Nazi past has no bearing on present 
day affairs, initially left the course because of personality clashes with other students.  
However, later in the film, his friend, Bomber, attempts to persuade him to rejoin stating, 
“You don’t have to come to class, but just be part of Die Welle” (0:45:00-0:46:00).  Finally, 
the members agree that anyone can participate who identifies as part of Die Welle’s cause.  
This sense of inclusivity reflects an evident desire to spread the “mission” of the group, as 
well as maintain that only individuals who are fully committed to Die Welle as a whole may 
participate as members. 
- 17 - 
 As Die Welle begins to organize and grow, the students seek to further the branding 
of the group.  Sinan develops a wave logo, which the students then use as a graffiti and 
sticker template.  The students, in an almost ambush of their town, begin spray-painting 
various surfaces across town with the Die Welle logo.  At one point, the students encounter 
the punk manifestation of the anarchist symbol painted on a window, and quickly paint Die 
Welle’s logo over top.   
 
Die Welle’s trademark painted over an anarchy symbol 
 
Although this initially appears as a simple example of adolescent mischief, it becomes 
increasingly evident that the students view their branding and guerilla-tactics of 
disseminating the group’s presence as a tool of political expression. Gansel presents a 
particular dichotomy between left- and right-radical politics by contrasting Die Welle with 
their anarchist counterparts, as seen by the red anarchy symbol overshadowed by the black 
Die Welle logo.  Later in the film, as Rainer drives to school, a bucket of red paint is dropped 
on his car by a group of punks, further exemplifying the red-black dichotomy as an indicator 
of divergent political ideology. 
 Gansel very carefully depicts the iconography of political extremism throughout his 
film with the stark contrast of Die Welle’s conservative black, and the anarchists’ raucous 
- 18 - 
red.  The colors of both groups, much like their ideologies, conflict significantly with one 
another, and present a true juxtaposition of group identity.  Similarly, just as the colors 
conflict with one another, Wenger’s radical teaching of autocracy conflicts with its 
conservative byproduct, e.g. Die Welle.  Throughout multiple scenes, the viewer witnesses 
the students in Wenger’s class confront their punk rivals fully prepared to defend their new 
movement.  However, within each brawl or spat between the two groups, there exists a 
constant theme: the emotion of identity.   
 
Members of Die Welle tagging buildings in their town 
 
 Whether verbally fighting over ideology, attempting to lay claim to territory, or 
exhibiting dominance, each group feels emotionally triggered by their opposition.  Gansel’s 
presentation of Die Welle’s clash with the anarchist punks depicts an overall motif of 
emotional investment inherent within group dynamics.  Although both groups represent two 
divergent ideologies, belonging to these groups often results in a similar end: an ardent 
commitment to group members, group ideology, and spreading the group’s message.  The 
anarchists’ stunt of dumping red paint on Wenger’s car certainly reflects a sense of 
adolescent rambunctiousness; however, more importantly it signifies an emotional outburst 
triggered by sudden frustration, and overwhelming threat caused by rivaling political 
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phenomena.  Moreover, the emotional nature of these groups represents an investment easily 
caused by a sense of small-town boredom.  Radical movements, particularly amongst youth, 
tend to appear as fun and appealing alternatives to the mundane existence of “regular” life. 
 Between recruiting new members, creating informational materials, and plastering the 
group’s logo across town, Die Welle effectively created their own propaganda material.  
What started as a classroom discussion topic, devolved into a political group with a specific 
ideology and clear opposition to standing societal norms.  This calls into question whether 
the essential thesis of the film—is a dictatorship still possible in present-day Germany?—
deserves consideration.   
 Given the film’s setting within a contemporary classroom, Gansel undoubtedly relies 
on specific tropes of adolescent personality to present the film’s social climate.  Most 
students presented in the film fill predictable roles within the classroom, such as Athlete, 
Student Leader, Slacker, etc., therefore it should come as no surprise that there would be a 
clear Outcast.  Gansel offers Tim, a quiet, ostensibly weird, student who appears to have little 
clout within the classroom’s social hierarchy.  Initially Gansel portrays Tim as a weakling 
within his classroom and social groups; however, the viewer quickly recognizes the subtle 
nuance of Tim’s character, and how his personality type—an individual fervently seeking a 
sense of societal belonging—defines the experience of Die Welle.  Furthermore, Gansel 
utilizes Tim’s character as an example of the types of individual, particularly within youth 
demographics, who often fall prey to radical ideologies.  
 Tim’s earliest scene in the film depicts him ‘selling’ drugs to classmates, which 
would lead the viewer to believe that he possessed some socially alternative qualities.  
However, Tim fails to actually sell his drugs for profit and instead offers them for free to his 
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peers.  This interaction reflects somewhat of a peace offering between Tim and his 
classmates, in addition to an ardent desire for invitation into his peers’ social realm.  Gansel’s 
initial presentation of Tim suggests an attitude of, “If I provide you with something that you 
desire, I will gain a relevant position within this society.”   
 Tim plays a crucial role in the inadvertent establishment of Die Welle as an autocratic 
group.  Within the film’s opening dialogue regarding autocracy, Tim immediately takes to 
Rainer’s instruction and suggestions for role-playing within the classroom.  While most 
students express some concern or slight hesitation, Tim quickly answers questions, 
emphasizes the importance of discipline, rapidly responds to Rainer, etc.  As Tim approaches 
Rainer at the end of the class session and vocalizes his enthusiasm for the project (0:21:20), 
Rainer seems pleased that at least one student is visibly engaged in the material; however, 
Tim quickly exhibits a level of enthusiasm and overzealousness worthy of mild concern. He 
continues to address Rainer as Herr Wenger, even after Rainer suggests he cease outside of 
class.  Similarly, he later provides his parents with a detailed and animated explanation of the 
course, only to be met with stark indifference (0:22:40).  Tim’s interaction with his parents 
signifies yet another realm in which he lacks a sense of belonging or acceptance.  Isolated 
from his parents and peers, Tim’s only option for inclusion lies in Rainer and Die Welle.  
 As the film progresses, so too does Tim’s passion for Die Welle.  Although 
participation within the group stems from a mandatory classroom experience, it nonetheless 
provides Tim with a sense of community he does not possess otherwise.  The viewer quickly 
learns that even an artificial sense of belonging, or in-group participation, can placate 
loneliness and isolation that some experience due to ostracization from society.  After 
determining Die Welle’s uniform, a simple white shirt, Gansel yet again portrays Tim’s 
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commitment to his new identity as he burns the clothing of his ‘past.’  Tim symbolically 
sacrifices his items from companies such as Nike and Adidas, which Rainer openly criticized 
as conflicting with the standards of Die Welle, all whilst wearing his new uniform of a white 
shirt (0:37:01).  As Tim burns his belongings, he literally and figuratively adopts his new 
identity.  By violently destroying his life from before Die Welle, Tim abandons the beliefs 
and values of his previous life and fully opts into the group and its identity. 
 
Tim burning his clothing from major brands 
 
 Later, Tim stands on the grounds of the school facing provocation from other students 
for drugs (0:41:20).  Powered by his newfound identity within the group, Tim attempts to 
fight back, presumably for the first time in his life after abandoning his complacent attitude 
(i.e. his pre-Die Welle identity).  Other classmates join Tim and offer their physical and 
emotional support, resulting in a visibly elated Tim.  Die Welle has provided Tim not only 
his own sense of self, but also a sense of belonging within a larger community identified not 
by individuals therein, but rather the collective group experience. 
 Shortly thereafter, a group of punks approach a few Die Welle members and criticize 
them for being “Welle Nazis” (1:00:01).  Standing in stark contrast of one another, members 
of Die Welle are dressed rather conservatively in comparison to the alternative appearance of 
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the punks—yet another reflection of Gansel’s use of color to juxtapose two opposing 
political ideologies.  As the punks and “Welle Nazis” instigate a fight with another, Tim 
quickly becomes flustered with the conversation and pulls a gun out of his pocket.  Both the 
punks and other Die Welle members are completely shocked by this gesture, and recognize 
that Tim clearly holds some sort of investment in Die Welle that extends beyond the ‘normal’ 
enthusiasm for what is, at its core, only a class project.  This zealotry reflects yet another 
instance in which Tim exhibits a certain commitment to Die Welle beyond that of other 
members, in addition to a clear wish for approval from his peers.   
 
 
Anarchists approach members of Die Welle 
 
 
 
Tim attempts to defend Die Welle from opposition 
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 Gansel initially presents Tim and his preoccupation with Die Welle as a unique case 
within the experiment of the class.  However, as the film continues, the viewer quickly 
discovers that other students, while not with the same rampant fervor as Tim, have come to 
appreciate their role within Die Welle.  Rainer receives criticism from his partner, Anke, 
about his role as de-facto leader of Die Welle.  Shortly after donning a white shirt (Die 
Welle’s uniform) for the first time in the film (1:28:22), Rainer calls members of Die Welle 
together for a communal meeting.  Rainer’s entrance into the school’s auditorium embodies 
the spirit of Die Welle and the commitment of its members: he steps onto the stage, greeted 
by a room full of students all dressed in white shirts, saluting with Die Welle’s signature 
wave gesture.  The scene further emphasizes the pivotal leader-follower dynamic typical of 
an autocratic group.  
 
Rainer addresses members of Die Welle 
 
Immediately the viewer recognizes the significant degree to which Die Welle has 
grown in the course of one week.  What once began as a classroom lesson by Rainer quickly 
developed into a school- and community-wide social movement.  To begin the meeting, 
Rainer reads student testimonials about their experience with the group (1:30:20):  
“Es geht nicht mehr darum, wer der oder die Schönste, Beste oder Erfolgreichste ist: Die 
Welle hat uns alle gleich gemacht. Herkunft und Religion, soziales Umfeld spielten keine 
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Rolle mehr. Wir gehörten alle einer Bewegung an. Die Welle gibt uns alle wieder eine 
Bedeutung. Wenn sich jeder auf die Anderen verlassen kann, erreichen wir so viel mehr. 
Dafür bin ich bereit mich selbst zurückzunehmen.“ 
 
The students’ commentary regarding Die Welle reiterates that, for participants, the group 
provides a sense of belonging and purpose within a larger community.  The students claim 
that individual background and experience remain of no consequence to belonging to Die 
Welle; however, the viewer recognizes that, from a sociological perspective, this false sense 
of inclusivity actually breeds in-group behavior.  Moreover, the viewer witnessed throughout 
the film instances in which other students experienced social repercussions for actively 
choosing to not join Die Welle, thus exacerbating the group’s exclusivity.  
After reading student testimonials aloud, the normally passive and peace-loving 
Rainer dons a commanding personality with a harsh and forceful tone—characteristics often 
seen with radical leaders.  Initially, Rainer claims that, despite others’ criticisms, the project 
should not end (1:31:10).  As his students erupt in applause, Rainer launches into a vibrant 
critique of contemporary Germany, in which he accuses politicians of being “Marionetten der 
Wirtschaft,” and declares the state a loser of globalization, and responsible for the overall 
degeneration of society (1:31:00-1:32:00).  As Marco attempts to criticize his commentary 
and pinpoint Die Welle as the problem, Rainer fights back saying, “Gemeinsam können wir 
alles schaffen […] wir haben heute die Möglichkeit Geschichte zu schreiben. […] Von hier 
aus wird die Welle ganz Deutschland überrollen!” (1:32:20).  The students respond viscerally 
to Rainer’s impassioned speech and begin to criticize Marco for his obstinance.   
 Just as the students appear ready to assault one of their own members, Rainer accuses 
them of acting solely on blind commitment to an individual and an abstract idea, i.e. Die 
Welle as a movement.  In the film’s most pivotal scene, Rainer bluntly states: “So was macht 
man in einer Diktatur.” (1:34:22)  He proceeds to remind his students about the question 
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posed the week prior at the beginning of the experiment: is a dictatorship still feasible in 
Germany?  Within moments, the students realize that Die Welle’s entire existence, as well as 
their veracious belief in the group’s mission, answers this question with a resounding ‘yes.’  
Rainer calmly, but assertively, states, “Das war genau das. Faschismus.” (1:34:55)  He 
proceeds to explain that what was supposed to be an inclusive group for all students quickly 
devolved into an exclusive group defined by brutality towards outsiders, an inflated sense of 
self, and isolation from mainstream society.    
 Suddenly the students recognize the relativity of Die Welle; while they may have 
found inclusion within the group, they simultaneously promoted exclusion of non-members, 
thus furthering an in- vs. out-group dynamic.  One student, Dennis, attempts to justify Die 
Welle stating, “Nicht alles mit der Welle ist schlecht. Ja, wir haben Fehler gemacht, aber wir 
können die korrigieren.” (1:35:53) to which Rainer succinctly replies that such a change is 
impossible within the group.  Unsurprisingly, Tim immediately objects to Rainer’s claims 
and accuses him of misguiding the students.  Within moments, Tim reveals a gun, accuses 
other students of not taking him and Die Welle seriously, and commits suicide as Rainer 
attempts to reason with him (1:37:40).   
 
Tim explaining the importance of Die Welle 
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 Tim’s death marks the film’s conclusion, as well as the final chapter of Die Welle.  
The abruptly violent and deeply tragic nature of Tim’s death leaves the viewer questioning 
whether we should perceive Tim as a martyr for, or victim of, Die Welle.  His commitment to 
the group and its mission far superseded that of any other student, and it remains apparent 
that he felt a deep allegiance to Rainer as a teacher, but foremostly as a leader.  Die Welle 
certainly possessed inclusive attributes for those who desperately sought to belong; however, 
the death of Tim, its most committed member, proves that the group held far more power 
over its members than anyone envisioned. 
 With his film Die Welle, Gansel presents how the quest for inclusion in groups 
supporting ideologies favoring change, regardless of how harmless they may seem, can easily 
lead to radical thought and societal isolation.  Gansel’s allegory of the students’ group, Die 
Welle, signifies that while finding a sense of collective identity within a group may yield 
positive communal experiences, the possible consequences of such in-group behavior far 
outweigh the benefits.  The formulation of a distinct identity within such groups, often 
manifested through uniforms, emblems, gestures, or social expectations—all of which Die 
Welle created for its members—proves that radical change may be achieved through small, 
seemingly mundane actions.   
 Although the group never adopts a specific political ideology, Gansel’s use of 
contemporary cultural references, such as World Cup 2006 and the juxtaposition of Die 
Welle members with anarchists, highlight the importance of monitoring groups that in any 
way propagate fascist or autocratic ideology within Germany.  Unlike Alex Grasshoff’s 1981 
film The Wave, which depicts Jones’ Third Wave experiment with an exclusive focus on 
Nazi Germany, Gansel transcends the boundaries of previous fascist tradition to emphasize 
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more overarching threats to democracy.  By limiting a critique of democratic instability to 
the era of National Socialism, one effectively negates any possibility of viable threats 
existing within a contemporary state.  An event with comparable magnitude of the Nazi 
occupation in World War II will likely never reoccur in Western society; however, 
innumerable micro-threats exist in modern democracies that allow not for irreversible 
collapse, but rather societal and political instability.  Without question, populist thinking that 
supports radical behavior in contemporary Germany, particularly within the right-wing 
movement, should be monitored and critiqued heavily. 
 With over 2.5 million viewers during its time in theaters, Die Welle ranks as one of 
Germany’s most successful films.13  Beyond box-office profit, the high attendance rate of the 
film proves that Germans continue to grapple with issues surrounding political radicalism.  
Students in the film arrive at their own answer to Rainer’s question regarding the feasibility 
of another German dictatorship due to their participation in Die Welle; similarly, German 
viewers of the film must consider the real-life presence of radical groups and individuals 
within Germany encouraging political extremism.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Contextualizing Right-wing Ideology as Part of Youth Culture:  
A Study of Andres Veiel’s Der Kick: ein Lehrstück über Gewalt (2008) 
 
In the opening credits of Die Welle, Gansel presents the audience with a notice that 
the film is “nach einer wahren Begebenheit.”  As stated previously, the story of Die Welle 
stems from a classroom experiment conducted in California during the 1960s, which Gansel 
then transposed into the German periphery.  The real-life origins of Die Welle seem almost 
inconsequential in the context of the film given how aptly Gansel placed the story within a 
German narrative.   
While maintaining core themes of youth movements and student-teacher dynamics, 
Gansel turned the story of The Wave into Die Welle by manipulating the everyday 
experience of contemporary, middle-class German teenagers.  Undoubtedly viewers of the 
film recognize the relevance of the story given its familiar setting; in its characters, suburban 
setting, and otherwise ‘tame’ environment, viewers easily see a version of their own life.  
Gansel entices viewers with a sense of familiarity and relatability, before completely 
interrupting the mundane setting with radical behavior.  The film’s merging of radical 
ideologies with familiar people and places leaves viewers questioning whether or not 
radicalism remains possible in their own lives.   
By presenting a world not far different from the viewer’s own, but tarnished by 
radical ideology, the film questions the vulnerability of contemporary culture to societal ills 
like radicalism.  Viewers exit the film in a state of self-reflection wondering, “Could that 
have been me?”  However, this introspection should not occur passively.  Makers of the film 
intend to thrust their intended audience—the educated, self-respecting, humanistically-
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inclined middle class—into a state of serious contemplation of the fragility of societal 
infrastructures.  
 Originally a documentary filmmaker, Andres Veiel authored the book Der Kick: ein 
Lehrstück über Gewalt in 2008 (the same year as Gansel’s debut of Die Welle).  Veiel’s book 
falls into a grey zone of part non-fiction, part journalism, and part memoir, detailing the 
brutal murder of Marinus Schöberl at the hand of two right-wing sympathizers. Veiel 
composed Der Kick after extensive research of “der Tat” (Marinus’ murder), including 
interviews with family members of the victim and perpetrators, and review of records 
associated with the case.  Similarly, Veil structured the book to retell the story in the 
historical and sociological context of Potzlow, a village in Brandenburg where the murder 
occurred.  Through a clear and concise narrative of Marinus’ murder, in addition to more in-
depth research on the state of Potzlow, Der Kick demonstrates the potential impact of right-
wing ideologies on youth. 
 Readers of Der Kick would be remiss in ignoring the book’s subtitle: ein Lehrstück 
über Gewalt. Veiel’s intent for the book to be used as a “Lehrstück” implies that the story of 
Marinus’ murder grants readers a particular lesson in morality.  More importantly, the book 
should lead readers to consider the possibility of radical ideology as impetus for brutal 
behavior, particularly within youth demographics.  However, unlike Die Welle, Der Kick 
profiles rural, working class communities in former East Germany—a likely unfamiliar 
environment for the book’s presumed audience (the aforementioned well-educated, middle 
class).  The familiarity and sense of belonging within the narrative of Die Welle fails to 
translate with Der Kick, and consequently Veiel’s text possesses a unique ability to teach by 
example, not through experience.  Der Kick educates readers on the threat of radicalism not 
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with relatable characters or setting, but rather an explicit portrait of brutality.  The 
presentation of Marinus’ murder and Potzlow’s complicated history requires readers to 
intellectually accept the threat of violence (i.e. right-wing radicalism) and evaluate how 
certain social environments foster such behavior.  While Die Welle causes viewers to 
question if society is as fragile and vulnerable as it may seem, Der Kick definitively answers 
that certain cultural traditions perpetuate weakened societal infrastructure, thus allowing for 
the intrusion of radicalism.  The radical nature of Die Welle exists temporarily due to the 
group’s confines within the school’s Projektwoche; despite having severe consequences, i.e. 
Tim’s death, order is restored in the end after the well-meaning students recognize their role 
in disrupting society.  Conversely, Der Kick presents youth in an environment where radical 
behavior and violence appear not only as a means of escaping the mundane, but a solution to 
the adolescent search for identity.  It is precisely that candor and insight that solidifies Der 
Kick’s role as a “Lehrstück über Gewalt.” 
 As stated previously, Der Kick addresses the murder of a teenager at the hand of peers 
involved with the right-wing scene.  Veiel offers readers a brief synopsis in the opening 
pages of the text: 
In der Nacht zum 13. Juli 2002 wurde der sechzehnjährige Marinus Schöberl von dem 
Brüderpaar Marco (dreiundzwanzig) und Marcel Schönfeld (siebzehn) sowie ihrem Kumpel 
Sebastian Fink (siebzehn) grausam misshandelt und schließlich von Marcel Schönfeld nach 
dem Vorbild des Bordsteinkicks aus dem Film „American History X“ umgebracht. Obwohl 
es Zeugen und Mitwisser gab, blieb die Tat monatelang unentdeckt. 
 
With this summary alone, the reader notices the relatively young age of the individuals 
involved: one 23-year old, two 17-year olds, and a 16-year old victim.  Immediately one must 
consider how individuals of such young ages could become entrenched in the radicalism of 
the right-wing scene, and more generally, commit murder.  Initial assumptions for the origin 
of extreme thought might be pedagogical upbringing, or youthful curiosity.  Although these 
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options seem plausible at surface level, Der Kick proves that the origins of radicalism are 
often more nuanced and deep-seated than one might assume. 
 Through first-hand interviews, extensive study of media reports, and general 
observation, Veiel presents a severe problem plaguing the youth of Potzlow: lack of parental 
responsibility and accountability.  Like many East German communities, Potzlow struggled 
significantly in the post-reunification period to reestablish its economic strength, leaving its 
citizens devoid of sufficient resources to capably provide for themselves and others.  Torsten 
Muchow, a Potzlow resident and parent, detailed his own struggle of adjusting to the 
standards of a post-reunification workplace: “Du arbeitest am Wochenende, unter der 
Woche, du arbeitest bis spat abends, du kümmerst dich einfach nicht mehr um diese Familie. 
Weil, du bist auch viel draußen. Liebe geht durch den Magen” (40).  Veiel explains that due 
to shrinking local tax revenues, many schools and vocational trainings consolidated or closed 
entirely (210).  Given the abysmal conditions for the adult workforce and a complete lack of 
sufficient educational opportunities for youth, it comes as no surprise that upward mobility 
seems like a fantasty for Potzlow residents: 
Schon zu Schulzeiten rechnen sich viele Jugendliche in Potzlow wenig Chancen aus, einmal 
in einem ihrer Wunschberufe einen Job zu bekommen. Die mangelnden beruflichen 
Perspektiven schlagen sich auf die Motivation der Schüler nieder. Wozu sich anstrengen, 
wenn man spatter ohnehin auf der Straße steht? (210) 
 
While post-reunification economic readjustment largely dictated the adult-youth dynamic, 
Veiel aptly addresses the manner in which cultural factors, namely the East German 
perspective on raising children, hindered communal development in Potzlow.  Veiel outlines 
a common critique that most East Germans grew accustomed to the state providing all 
resources necessary for a fulfilling life, and maintained this expectation even after 
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reunification (216).  The expectation of state-funded schools and youth centers allowed for 
parents to deflect responsibility for actively rearing their own children.   
Due to a pervasive lack of communal structure, adults in the Potzlow community 
inadvertently truncate adolescent development by granting youth the freedom to act 
autonomously.  The lack of parental guidance further exacerbates standing structural 
weaknesses within the community, thus forcing youth to seek out other forms of community 
that provide consistently dependable, and available, relationships.  In the case of Der Kick, 
many youth quickly find solace in the radical right-wing scene due to its clear internal 
structure: social hierarchy, predetermined ideology, and regimented expectations for 
participants.   
 Early in the text, Veiel references commentary from a public prosecutor covering the 
murder trial who has observed the parental negligence plaguing the community.  He says, 
“Da kann man natürlich fragen, wo waren die Eltern, warum lassen die ihre Kinder da sitzen? 
[sic] Man kümmert sich nicht umeinander” (Veiel 18).  Shortly thereafter, Jutta Schönfeld 
(mother of Marco and Marcel, the defendants in the case) describes the disconnect she felt 
from her eldest son Marco and his behavior: “Den Marco habe ich schon vorher verloren. 
Der hat sich seine eigene Welt gebaut, die gibt’s nich. Das fing mit 13 an” (22).  Jutta’s self-
identified strained relationship with her son arguably signifies a far deeper degree of 
disconnect than even she admits.  Clearly, Jutta wishes to explain that her son’s behavior 
stems from a core personality difference evident at even the young age of 13 years old; 
however, the reader recognizes that her explanation remains only a deflection of 
responsibility for her son’s criminal behavior. 
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 As adults gloss over their own shortcomings as parents, children are left to find 
sources of guidance and support elsewhere.  In the case of the Schönfeld brothers, Marcel 
often depended upon his older brother, Marco, to fill the role of protector and confidant.  
Marcel states, “[Marco] hat mir immer geholfen. Und dann war er plötzlich weg, im Knast. 
Und ich stand ganz alleine da” (34).  Previously Marcel explained that he received his first 
pair of Springerstiefel, a type of combat boot often associated with neo-Nazis, from Marco.  
Similarly, after a prosecutor interrogates his connection to the right-wing scene, Marcel 
states, “Ich war rechts, weil mein Bruder auch rechts war. Als er dann in den Knast kam, 
habe ich mich dann den anderen angepasst” (41).   
Based on Marcel’s testimony, it seems evident to the reader that Marco provided his 
brother with ideological guidance, tools for navigating the adolescent social scene, and 
camaraderie—roles generally performed by a parent.  The confluence of a strong sibling 
relationship with a lack of firm parental supervision results in a social framework devoid of 
any concrete structure.  Accordingly, this lack of structure allowed for the youth of Der Kick 
to function as autonomous adults, even if developmentally they were unprepared to do so.  
The reader witnesses the lapse between perceived adulthood and developmental ability 
nowhere more so than in the young men’s response to Marnius’ death.  In his testimony, 
Marcel explains that he failed to contact police or emergency medics out of fear for his 
brother and his friend, Sebastian Fink (51).  Marcel felt a clear commitment to his brother, 
and trusted his executive decision-making, even if it meant compromising Marinus’ safety; 
he explains, “Von meinem Bruder kam die Idee. Ich war damit einverstanden” (51).  This 
testimony alone demonstrates how the social freedom inadvertently granted to Potzlow youth 
evolves into indulgent expression of reckless, radical ideology and behavior.  
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 Veiel utilizes a unique literary approach to detail the experiences of the Schönfeld 
brothers: he begins the novel with a detailed outline of the conflict, instead of providing 
context for the actors involved.  Veiel previously highlighted the struggle between parental 
guidance and youthful autonomy; however, it is only within the latter half of the text that the 
reader begins to recognize the direct consequences of parental negligence on Potzlow youth, 
particularly Marco and Marcel. 
Due to their adamant desire to distinguish themselves from adult authority, the 
Schönfeld brothers sought an alternative outlet through which they could experience 
community.  For Marco and Marcel, the right-wing scene offered a sense of belonging; many 
even considered it like a family (54).  Marco’s first instances of criminal activity began at the 
ages of 12 and 13, during which time he befriended a man described as, “total tätowiert mit 
Glatze, das war en total Rechter gewesen” (53).  The “Wegmann,” as Marco described him, 
simultaneously threatened the Schönfeld parents stating, “Wenn sie Marco noch einmal 
wegschlössen, komme [ich] persönlich vorbei” (72).  The irony of this interaction, of course, 
remains that Marco’s parents allowed another adult to bully them; moreover, it is precisely 
this disengagement, either forced or chosen, that indicates a severe lapse in the Schönfelds’ 
ability to protect their son from detrimental influences.  After this introduction to the right-
wing scene, Marco adopted the overall appearance (Glatze included) associated with the 
right-wing, and simultaneously adopted a new identity.   
The newfound right-wing community provided Marco with a degree of structure 
lacking from his home life, thus seemingly insulating him from the same trials experienced 
previously.  Angela Becker, Marco’s girlfriend and fellow member of the right-wing scene, 
provided him with a sense of comfort and newfound drive to finish his schooling and 
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apprenticeship (79).  However, Marco’s criminal tendencies continued and his life displayed 
similar signs of inconsistency: drunkenly assaulting a supervisor, assaulting a punk, burglary, 
driving without a license, breaking and entering, and more (81-4).   
Nevertheless, the assumed insulation and safety net of the right-wing scene clearly 
did not exist to the degree that Marco needed, or desired.  After a string of arrests, in 
February 1999, a district court convicted Marco of criminal assault and trespassing, with a 
sentence of one year and six months in prison (85).  A serious conviction should have 
resulted in Marco more critically evaluating his life and involvement within the right-wing 
scene; but as opposed to considering whether involvement with Rechte prompted his recent 
trouble, Marco blamed himself.  He believed wholeheartedly that a relationship with Angela 
and involvement in the right-wing scene offered credibility and stability that he lacked 
otherwise: “Er merkt, dass sein fehlender Schulabschluss und die Tatsache, dass er keine 
Arbeit hat, im ‘Rankin’ der Gruppe eine Rolle spielen. Aber er will um jeden Preis dazu 
gehören” (85).  Marco’s willingness to fight for belonging reemphasizes the indoctrinated 
sense of community, structure, and most importantly, a legitimate sense of purpose, provided 
by the right-wing scene. 
 Even prior to Marco’s conviction, his parents deflected any significance of his legal 
misbehavior.  Marcel explained, “der Vater [hat] die Probleme von Marco eher relativiert, 
nach dem Motto: ‘Jeder hat mal mit der Polizei Schwierigkeiten’” (94).  At the same time, 
Marcel clashed with classmates in school.  While Jutta Schönfeld attempted to help her son 
by speaking to the school director, Marco’s involvement proved more impactful.  Marco 
offered his younger brother physical assistance by threatening Marcel’s classmates (95).  
Although Jutta offered a rational, predictable parental response to her son’s problems, Marcel 
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identified more value in his brother’s more immediate solution to his problems.  While 
Jutta’s solution required Marcel to play an active role in bettering his situation, Marco 
represented a single method of physical altercation that required little change on Marcel’s 
part.  Regardless, Marcel soon adopted his brother’s default uniform, “Springerstiefel und 
eine Bomberjacke und er lässt sich eine Glatze schneiden” (95), drawn to the physical 
identity of the right-wing. 
Despite attempting to play a more active role in assisting their children, Marcel 
explains that, “Die Eltern […] haben auf das neue Outfit ‘ganz normal reagiert. Sie waren 
das von Marco gewöhnt’” (95).  One again the reader observes the inconsistent degrees to 
which the Schönfeld parents attempt to regulate and monitor their children’s behavior, and 
personal lives.  While it seemed entirely appropriate for Jutta to assist her son with his 
squabbles at school, offering any commentary on the outwardly right-wing identities of both 
sons remained unnecessary.  The Schönfeld parents repeatedly exhibit unpredictability in 
their ability to implement any sort of structure in their childrens’ lives.   
Similarly, rather than correcting their previous parenting mistakes made with Marco 
in order to better Marcel, the Schönfelds simply ignore these errors, thus further exacerbating 
the atypical behaviors of both sons.  As Marcel continued to spend more time with his older 
brother, oftentimes accompanying him during his various criminal acts, the Schönfelds 
observed, crestfallen that both sons fell prey to rebellion.  Veiel explains, “[s]eine Eltern sind 
enttäuscht, dass ihr Jüngster, zu dem sie eine innige Beziehung haben, bei ‘so was’ 
mitmacht” (95)—yet they failed to act upon frustration.  The Schönfelds own inaction did 
nothing to subvert Marcel’s growing interest, and admiration, of Marco. 
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Authorities arrested Marco within days of the rampage led by him and his younger 
brother that ultimately left Marinus Schöberl dead.  Unsurprisingly, Marco’s arrest deeply 
affected Marcel, who existed in a persistent state of detachment from his surroundings.  The 
Schönfelds attempted to engage with their son, but when they received little reaction, they 
simply assumed that he readopted a previous drug habit and “[…] fragen aber nicht weiter 
nach” (164).  Later, as Marcel and his mother return to his former school, a teacher 
immediately noticed Marcel’s outwardly right-wing appearance.  Although she attempted to 
highlight the severity of Marcel’s looks to his mother, the teacher was met with stark 
indifference: “Jutta Schönfeld ist von ihrem Sohn überfordert. Sie schafft es nicht, Grenzen 
zu setzen. ‘Was soll ich den machen? Der macht was er will.’” (165).  Even after numerous 
police encounters in the past regarding her sons’ behavior—not to mention the most recent 
drama surrounding Marinus’ murder—the Schönfelds, particularly Jutta, failed to accept any 
responsibility for the young men’s upbringing.  Clearly, rather than recognizing the grave 
perverseness of the Marco and Marcel’s existence, Jutta bemoaned her own exhaustion and 
avoided addressing the issues at hand.   
On the night of Marinus’ brutal murder, Marco invited friends from the right-wing 
scene to his home for a casual hangout.  Marco enthusiastically described his plans to his 
mother, but Jutta would later explain, “dass sie von Anfang an ein ungutes Gefühlt gehabt 
habe” (129).  Unsurprisingly, the lack of direct involvement on behalf of the Schönfelds, and 
consequently the gratuitous sense of freedom felt by Marco, led to a horrific crime that may 
have otherwise been prevented.  Jürgen claims, “Wir haben alles getan, was man tun kann. 
Wir haben unsere Kinder gut erzogen” (22).  The Schönfeld parents certainly had moments 
in which they attempted to effectively guide and mentor their children.  However, moments 
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of inaction and blatant deflection of concerning behavior in their children greatly 
overshadowed the amount of parental control exhibited by Jutta and Jürgen.  Matthias 
Muchow, a friend of Marinus, criticized the Schönfeld parents for not paying better attention 
to their children’s behavior; however, he also questions what degree of influence the 
Schönfelds could have had “wenn die Kinder scho scheiße sind” (172).  While Jürgen 
pronounces that he and his wife did the best, and most, that they could in nurturing Marco 
and Marcel, the statement seems more like wishful thinking than earnest self-evaluation. 
The question of national identity and what it means to look, think, and act ‘German,’ 
pervades contemporary Germany.  Part of the discussion surrounding the question of identity 
remains how Germans can be proud of their heritage, politics, and even sports teams, without 
being too proud.  Oftentimes, the easiest solution for many seems to be an outright rejection 
of any form of national pride, thus immediately labeling prideful Germans as radical or right-
wing.  Although these labels may seem arbitrary and based on ideological bias, the fact 
remains that many members of the right-wing scene, particularly self-identified neo-Nazis, 
have created a physical image and embodiment of their beliefs.  Most Germans would agree 
that a stereotypical neo-Nazi adopts an unofficial uniform of black combat boots 
(Springerstiefel), leather bomber jackets, and of course, a completely shaved head.  While 
this archetype may seem exaggerated, in reality the details of imagery as part of neo-Nazi 
identity are even more specific: white shoelaces to symbolize superiority of the white race; 
Fred Perry t-shirts with their ‘88’ symbol, an homage the “Heil Hitler” (H is the eighth letter 
of alphabet), or Thor Steinar pullovers; tattoos of a Black Sun. 
As members of the far-right, one would assume that Marco and Marcel would hold 
firm beliefs regarding Jews, German identity, immigration, and a number of other issues.  
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Similarly, the reader would assume that the victim of a heinous crime executed by two 
conservative skinheads would somehow function as a threat to the aforementioned beliefs.  
Marinus, however, did not fulfill those criteria; in fact, others portray him to be about as 
‘normal’ and German as Marco and Marcel.  In Der Kick, the reader learns that the 
motivation for Marinus’ murder stemmed not from the Schönfeld brothers’ hatred of him, but 
rather their perverse fascination with “curb stomping” (Bordsteinkick) from the American 
film, American History X.  Marco and Marcel self-identify as members of a radical 
community whose sole raison d’être remains politically driven; yet they remain preoccupied 
with a particularly gruesome scene from an American movie!   
 
 
Edward Norton portraying a neo-Nazi in American History X, during the infamous curb stomp scene 
 
Regardless, this fascination with imagery over ideology offers insight into whether or 
not the right-wing scene encompasses a level of superficiality.  Thorsten Muchow, father of 
Marinus’ friend Matthias, described the Schönfeld brothers as “Hilfschüler, und die haben 
viel zu viele Filme geguckt. Guck sie dir doch an, mit ihren Springerstiefeln. Ich weiß nicht, 
was das soll. Die haben nichts zu tun, nur Langeweile, und da kommen sie auf dusselige 
Ideen” (29).  Muchow’s comments offer a refreshingly skeptical tone from the perspective of 
a parent, who unlike Jutta and Jürgen Schönfeld, clearly identifies fault in the casual 
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assumption of radical behavior.  Although Muchow struggles to effectively articulate his 
opinion (“Ich weiß nicht, was das soll”), he at least attempts to conceptualize the implications 
of the Schönfeld brothers’ behavior.  Even so, these comments further indicate the 
overwhelming sense of hopelessness within adults in Potzlow.  By describing radical ideas as 
“dusselig,” Muchow inadvertently underestimates the destructiveness of said radicalism.  The 
inability to fully grasp the severity of radicalism continuously reminds the reader of the 
socioeconomic and intellectual limitations of the Potzlow community.  Despite its 
limitations, Muchow’s comments clearly address the absurdity of the Schönfeld brothers’ 
fervent involvement in the right-wing scene.  Moreover, Muchow’s statement first introduces 
the reader to the possibility of a political identity grounded only in the outward, physical 
manifestation of said identity, due to a complete inability to intellectually comprehend its 
political ideology.  
 Undoubtedly, the imagery affiliated with the contemporary right-wing movement 
impacts not only those involved with the scene, but all citizens, due to the images’ deeply 
entrenched heritage in German history.  Accordingly, the problem arises that many 
immediately associate those images with neo-Nazis and the right-wing movement based on 
their contemporary context.  However, Der Kick questions this immediate assumption by 
portraying individuals, namely youth, who adopt the imagery and visible identity of right-
wing radicalism, but forsake a vested interest (and arguably, understanding) in the relevant 
political ideology.  For young people like the Schönfeld brothers and their peers, the physical 
incarnation of right-wing radicalism—Springerstiefel, Glatzen, Bomberjacke, etc.— evokes a 
visceral sense of rebellion and societal autonomy.  Ultimately the youth of Potzlow have less 
invested in understanding an ultra-conservative political movement, but rather showing those 
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surrounding them that they have a determined, crafted identity.  Simply put, participating in 
the right-wing scenes proves to others a sense of belonging and purpose. 
Marcel undeniably first entered the right-wing scene due to brother’s involvement, 
and received extensive guidance from Marco on how to be a true Rechter. 
Mit zwölf hatte ich meine ersten Stiefel, von Marco. Mit Stiefeln kriegste mehr Ansehen. Am 
Anfang hamse mich fertig gemacht deshalb, Anfang achte Klasse, wegen der Stiefel. 
Springerstiefel. Die anderen in der Klasse, die hatten so Hip-Hop-Sachen. Immer so ne 
Sprüche, Scheiß-Fascho und so was denn. Da hat ich dann gar keinen Bock mehr auf Schule. 
(34) 
 
Marcel’s commentary holds three important theses: first, a larger number of students 
embraced the physical identity of the hip-hop, which one can more generally interpret to 
mean mainstream pop culture; secondly, this embrace of the mainstream likely stems from a 
visceral disdain for conservative/right-radical culture (due to a variety of societal and 
historical factors); and finally, that Springerstiefel so easily serve as the physical 
manifestation of the right-wing identity (i.e. “Scheiß-Fascho”).  While Marcel may have 
developed a political opinion that justifies donning the physical identity of right-wing 
ideology, the likelihood of him having reached that conclusion in the early stages of 
adolescence seems unlikely.  Therefore, the reader can aptly assume that the offering of 
Springerstiefel or other relics of the right-wing identity appeal to Marcel, and likely many 
other youth, due to their immediate shock value and possible connection to a defined 
community. 
 Involvement in the right-wing scene clearly plays a large role in the relationship 
between the Schönfeld brothers.  History has shown time again that the age of adolescence 
results in a fervor for rebellion and anti-authority behavior.  For both Marco and Marcel, 
their personal connection to the right-wing scene stems primarily from their relationship with 
one another, but also their status as youth predisposed to involvement in subculture 
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movements.  In a society with a larger emphasis on stronger parent-child dynamics, one 
might assume that adults would intervene to reevaluate the degree to which youth involve 
themselves in such movements.   
An instructor of Marcel’s described him as “ein ganz normaler Jugendlicher, der nach 
Orientierung gesucht hat” (41).  He qualified his comment further by explaining that 
Marcel’s skinhead seemed inconsequential because “[a]uf solche Dinge lege ich keinen Wert. 
Ich möchte nicht irgendwie ’n Feindbild schaffen” (42).  At first this instructor’s comments 
seem problematic, and eerily similar to the hands-off approach of the Schönfeld parents.  
However, his lack of true concern derives from skepticism in the legitimacy of Marcel’s 
political identity: 
Das sag ich heute immer noch: Leute wie Marcel, die haben doch von Politik keine Ahnung. 
Die wissen ja nicht was los ist, da kann ich sagen, du bist ein Nazi. Was er da zu Tina gesagt 
hat—Nigger auf’n Scheiterhaufen, die brennen besser wie Dachpappe—, da steht er nicht 
dahinter, das is einfach so blöd daher gesagt. Die haben da ganz andere Ausdrücke, die 
kennen doch keine anderen. Heute find ich’s ganz toll, rote Schnürsenkel zu tragen, morgen 
ziehe ich mir andere ein.  (42) 
 
The instructor seems ultimately of the opinion that Marcel’s outward political identity 
extends only as far as his shoelaces and the top of his bare head.  Heiko Gäbler, an apprentice 
with whom Marcel had a mutual friend, claimed that Marcel adopted his questionable guise 
with misguided intentions: 
Ich hab ne Haarschneidemaschine ohne Aufsatz. … Aber er wollt: null Millimeter. Er kam 
am Sonntag dann an, hat Springerstiefel angehabt, Fred-Perry-T-Hemd, war schon komisch 
gewesen. Is so mit Fred-Perry-Zeichen. Is nur mit Ehrenkranz, normalerweise steht da 88 und 
der Ehrenkranz. 88 für Heil Hitler… Marcel is’n Mitläufer. Der denkt nicht nach. (38) 
 
Marcel’s almost stereotypical appearance easily compounded his visibly bizarre behavior.   
While Marcel may present himself as the prototype of the right-wing scene, both in his 
physical representation and vocalized opinions, he fails to possess a deeper understanding of 
his cause, or his role therein.   
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Marcel explained Marco’s ideological position as a “nationaler Rechter, er müsse 
Deutschland beistehen” (41).  Ironically, when asked of his own opinion, Marcel stood in 
direct opposition of his brother stating, “die Ausländer sind auch Menschen wie wir, wenn 
wir nach Polen fahren, sind wir ja dort auch Ausländer” (41).  Marcel may hold a superficial 
understanding of his assumed politics, but the question remains whether or not these artificial 
identities are any more or less dangerous than ‘true’ neo-Nazis, i.e. members of the right-
wing motivated exclusively by political ideology, not only imagery and outward identity. 
 Inevitably, as Marco entered prison for the first time, Marcel confirms the notion that 
his physical identity bares no influence on a genuine ideology by abandoning his physical 
identity.  Marco’s absence from his younger brother’s life left Marcel with a sense of 
abandonment, during which time he “lässt sich die Haare wieder länger wachsen und legt die 
Stiefel ab” (97).  Simply dismissing the right-wing appearance would be reason enough to 
question Marcel’s political intentions; however, in abandoning the right-wing for an 
outwardly left-wing identity, Marcel proved that personal adoption of physical political 
identity dictates societal inclusion first and foremost. Marco’s incarceration forced Marcel to 
lose his primary support system, and no longer necessitated a strict prescription to Marco’s 
staunch expectations of right-wing participation. 
Als er dann in den Knast kam, habe ich mich dann den anderen angepasst. Die Situation in 
Prenzlau hatte sich verändert. Viele ehemalige Rechte wurden eher Hip-Hopper und Technos. 
Denen habe ich mich angepasst.” (41) 
 
Clearly, other youth echoed Marcel’s preference for a more superficial involvement in the 
right-wing scene.   
 In contrast to his younger brother, Marco expressed a slightly more legitimate interest 
in full adoption of right-wing identity and ideology.  Marco’s incarceration exempted Marcel 
from Springerstiefel and his Glatze, and “mehrfach wechselt er die Farbe der Haar, die er nun 
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auch länger wachsen lässt” (101).  However, this phase of reckless identity abandonment 
lasted only until the brothers reunited.  Having squabbled with punks in the past (81), Marco 
vehemently rejected Marcel’s new, seemingly ‘left’ appearance.  Marcel visited his brother in 
prison with a crop of blue hair, to which Marco questioned “ob er jetzt auf Punk mache” 
(103).  Yet again the brothers’ dynamic reemphasizes the importance of outward political 
representation, regardless of internal ideology.  Unsurprisingly, ten days before Marco’s 
release from prison, Marcel shaved his head entirely and bought a new pair of Springerstiefel 
(103).   
 Although evidence exists that the Schönfeld brothers’ interest in the right-wing scene 
may have been moderately superficial, any involvement remains cause for concern in 
contemporary Germany.  The historical and societal traditions affiliated with National 
Socialism run deeply through German society and, for many, serve only to subvert the 
established democracy.  During the review of Marinus’ murder case, the district attorney 
offered a very critical analysis of the Schönfeld brothers: 
Die Täter Marco und Marcel Schönfeld sowie Sebastian Fink hatten ein dumpfes 
rechtsextremistisches Gedankengut und den unbedingten Willen, das in Gewaltform 
auszuleben. (23) 
 
This initial statement leads the reader to believe that the prosecutor determined Marco and 
Marcel as big a threat to the community as any other neo-Nazi or right-wing radical.  
However, as he expands his commentary, the tone shifts dramatically: 
Am Tatabend war weder ein Asylbewerber, ein Jude oder irgendjemand, worauf das 
Feindbild zutraf, vorhanden. Deshalb musste hier ein Kumpel als Notopfer herhalten, weil 
den Tätern kein besserer begegnete. Nach unserer Auffassung hat das Opfer Schöberl nach 
den ganzen Misshandlungen sein eigenes Todesurteil gesprochen, indem er gesagt hat: Ich 
bin Jude. Hätte er zu diesem Zeitpunkt gesagt, spinnt hier nicht rum, ich bin doch euer 
Kumpel Marinus, ich glaube nicht, dass der Tötungsakt dann über die Bühne gegangen 
wuare. Das ist kein Vorwurf, sondern einfach eine Feststellung. (23) 
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Although Marco and Marcel possessed a clear allegiance to the right-wing scene, the 
prosecutor highlights that the brothers sought out a target for their violence who may not 
represent the average victim of right-wing attacks.  Simply put, the Schönfeld brothers 
attacked Marinus for lack of a ‘better’ or more appropriate option.  However, the reader 
should question here whether the brothers truly assaulted Marinus for lack of more fitting 
victims, or rather only for the sake of harming another individual.  It seems apparent that 
Marco and Marcel have a complicated relationship with the right-wing scene insofar that 
their commitment to its political ideology may be lacking, and therefore they could not have 
murdered Marinus with political intentions in mind. 
 As stated in the defense attorney’s statement, Marinus repeatedly identified himself as 
Jewish; however, the definitive tone of the prosecutor’s comment does little to unpack the 
explanation for Marinus’ self-identification.  In his testimony, Marcel explained that on the 
evening of the murder Marco forcefully questioned Marinus as to whether or not he is Jewish 
(30).  Others present at the time encouraged Marinus to simply admit that he was Jewish, 
“dann wäre Ruhe” (30), clearly in an effort to placate Marco’s drunken rage.  After Marinus 
repeatedly vocalizing “Ja, ich bin ein Jude,” Marcel recalls that he, Marco, and their friend 
Sebastian violently lashed out, insulting Marinus: “Du Jude, du Penner du Assi und so 
weiter” (31). Identifying as Jewish amongst right-wing enthusiasts remains an undeniably 
provocative and bold decision; however, the response from the Schönfeld brothers question 
whether or not this Jewish identity was actually a problem, or simply Marinus personally and 
his status within the larger societal framework.  The use of ‘Jew’ in a string of slang 
pejoratives directly undermines any political statement that Marco and Marcel possibly 
sought to make.   
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By accusing Marinus of being Jewish, in addition to being homeless and asozial, the 
brothers effectively provide a criticism exclusively driven, not by racial or religious 
elements, but socioeconomic factors, thus diverging preconceived notions of right-wing 
politics.  Still, could Marinus’ Jewish identity serve as a sufficient impetus for the Schönfeld 
brothers’ violence?  Marco explained in his testimony that he and Marinus knew one another 
previously, and “Wenn ich gegen den wat gehabt hätte, dann hätte ich schon früher wat mit 
ihm gemacht” (60).  Surprisingly, Marco confirmed that Marinus’ Jewish identity had 
nothing to do with his actions: 
Wenn ich gegen den wat gehabt hätte, dann hätte ich schon früher wat mit ihm gemacht. 
Jude, det habe ich schon zu viele gesagt, und die hab ich auch nicht umgebracht. Der war 
nicht der Grund. Ich wollt den nie umbringen. Ich hab ihn auch nicht umgebracht. Ich wollt 
ihn nur quälen und ärgern. … Ich wusst selbst nicht, warum mein Bruder den da reinbeißen 
lässt, aber ich hatt natürlich auch nichts dagegen. Als Marcel darauf gesprungen ist, war es 
für mich auch ein richtiger Schock. (60) 
 
Marco’s admission of having little interest in Marinus’ identity entirely derails any argument 
that political ideology from the right-wing motivated the Schönfeld brothers.  Clearly, both 
Marco and Marcel’s own perverse obsession with brutality motivated the crime.  It is 
important to note, however, that Marco’s testimony further confirms a serious interest in 
establishing social hierarchy through bullying and violent behavior, both of which pervade 
right-wing doctrine, although they are not indicative of a conclusive political ideology 
exclusively.  Marinus’ murder—which Marco laughably denies—served only one purpose 
for the Schönfeld brothers: youthful entertainment.  When asked for his opinion on Marinus, 
Marcel responded curtly: “Getan hat er mir an diesem Abend nichts. Ich habe nur 
geschlagen, weil es alle gemacht haben” (24).  Right-wing political ideology may not have 
motivated the Schönfeld brothers, but group identity and inclusion undoubtedly influenced 
their actions; Veiel explains later in the text, “Keiner der Täter hätte auch nur im Ansatz die 
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an den Tag gelegte Aggressionsbereitschaft entwickelt, wenn er mit Marinus allein gewesen 
wäre” (205). 
 The arbitrary murder of Marinus easily typified the Schönfeld brothers as illegitimate 
Rechter, despite both Marco and Marcel previously attempting to engage in the political 
aspects of the right-wing scene with questionable success.  Marco claimed to have always 
felt like a Rechter, praising the socialist society of the German Democratic Republic for its 
lack of foreigners (55).  However, yet again, Marco reveals a complete lack of intellectual 
understanding for the politics that he claims to so ardently support.  Veiel addresses this 
misinterpretation of East German policy later in the text: “Grundsatz der SED-Politik war, 
dass sich die DDR nicht als Nachfolgestaat des NS-Regimes verstand” (249).  
Unsurprisingly, Marco accused immigrants of taking up valuable space for German workers 
in the German economy, and even encouraged rebuilding the Berlin Wall in an effort to 
regain order and have “der Schmutz […] weg” (55).  Opinions like Marco’s permeate right-
wing circles, and while many in the scene may have vested political interest in such policies, 
others are more concerned with adopting the identity represented by such comments.  In 
other words, many individuals embrace the identity of a true, born-and-bred, German 
nationalist for the sake of belonging to the right-wing scene and having a crafted identity that 
appears political, even if it is not.  Angela Becker, Marco’s girlfriend during his adolescence, 
joined the right-wing at a young age and viewed it very much as a surrogate family; however, 
“um politische Inhalte geht es dabei kaum” (79).   
 As Marco delved further into the right-wing scene, he sought to extend his experience 
beyond physical identity (Springerstiefel, Glatze, etc.) into the ideological experience of the 
right-wing.  Even still, this attempt for a substantiated involvement in the right-wing failed to 
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translate to genuine political investment.  Marco and his compatriots enjoyed right-extreme 
music and periodically attended demonstrations and rallys of the National Democratic Party 
(NPD); however, Marco attended only to join his friends and “mit Politik beschäftigt er sich 
sonst wenig” (85).  When Marco did attempt to express his political identity, it encompassed 
a very naïve, superficial presentation of “groben Versatzstücken aus dem rechtsextremen 
Zitatenschatz, vermischt mit Parolen aus den Liedern von Frank Rennicke und diverser 
rechtsextremer Bands” (85-6).  These Versatzstücken signify a collection of individual 
descriptions or symbols that appear appropriate in isolation, but fail to provide any 
comprehensive image or overarching understanding in a larger collection. Although Marco 
deemphasized his physical identity in the right-wing, he still failed to grasp the deeper 
political implications of his actions, and the sources from which they came. 
 Marco influenced Marcel to join him at NPD demonstrations, including one in Berlin 
discussing the issue of children’s benefits (Kindergeld) provided by the federal government, 
where Marcel busied himself with defending himself from the threat of Turks, other 
immigrants, and punks in the city (96).  At a rally that was inherently political given its clear 
emphasis on domestic policy issues, Marcel prioritized embracing arguably the most basic 
tenant of the right-wing (xenophobia) over engaging with other members of the right-wing 
community for political reasons.  Angela commented on Marco’s apolitical nature stating, 
“Nach außen hin trägt er Stiefel und schneidet sich eine Glatze, aber das war’s dann auch 
schon” (86).  Adopting a Glatze allowed for a minimal level of political engagement, while 
maintaining a clear commitment to the overall ethos and aesthetic of the right-wing 
movement.  Although Angela initially referred to Marco only, it becomes increasingly self-
evident that a statement of superficiality could be applied to both Schönfeld brothers. 
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 The core irony of the contemporary right-wing movement rests in its stark contrast to 
the era of National Socialism.  Given the aversion of most Germans towards any element of 
the Nazi era, the new right-wing had little option but to recraft the image of what a true 
Rechter looked like.  While the right-wing has successfully rebranded its physical identity, as 
evidenced by Marco and Marcel, many do not immediately associate the new right-wing with 
nationalist ideology akin to Nazism due to differing visual cues with the current movement.  
This disassociation remains highly problematic for it permits individuals to deflect the 
significance of the mere existence of nationalism.  Jürgen Schönfeld described his childhood 
in which students were required to visit concentration camp memorials, watch films outlining 
Nazi brutality, etc. (55-6).  Moreover, he makes a shortsighted assessment of the current 
right-wing identity divergence from the Nazi-era: 
Da is keiner von den Nazis mit ner Glatze rumgelaufen, die haben alle nen vernünftigen 
Haarschnitt gehabt. Die Einzigsten, die mit ner Glatz rumlaufen mussten, waren die 
Kommunisten, die sie damals umgebracht haben, die Juden, und alles, nicht, die sind mit 
Glatze rumgelaufen. (56)  
 
Ultimately Jürgen presents a critical point: the contemporary right-wing movement, though 
frequently compared to National Socialism, seeks to craft its own ideology and identity 
relevant to a contemporary setting.  While there are inevitably some similarities—
nationalism as a political theory will maintain some characteristics regardless of time and 
space in which it is practiced—the new standard for nationalism is no longer the Nazi 
archetype of the 1930s or World War II.  However, this new standard in many ways is more 
dangerous due to its unpredictable nature.  As the movement grows and changes, it maintains 
a degree of unpredictability, thus making any elements of violent ideology even more 
dangerous.  Jürgen was quick to recognize the difference in his sons’ form of right-wing 
identity as compared to the Nazi archetype; however, he inadvertently deemphasized the 
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problematic nature of his sons’ identities (yet another example of the Schönfeld’s parental 
inaction). 
In an account portraying the brutality of the right-wing scene, it seems inevitably 
laughable and ironic that the core conflict revolves around the dichotomy of image vs. 
ideology prevalent amongst youth involved with the scene.  By lacking any investment in 
true right-wing ideology, as well as having any interest in capitalist, American pop culture, 
the Schönfeld brothers have completely avoided the true meaning of right-wing radicalism: 
political engagement and opposition of the mainstream status quo.  Initially the Schönfeld 
brothers’ superficial understanding of their cause seems laughable and not worthy of critical 
analysis; however, despite the superficiality, Marco and Marcel involved themselves in a 
movement that is inherently political, and in many cases violent.  It remains imperative that 
contemporary society address whether or not involvement in these movements, even in the 
most lighthearted or fad-like ways, proves detrimental for democracy and social stability.   
 The Schönfeld brothers exist in an environment in which a lack of stringent adult 
authority exacerbates common struggles with identity during adolescence; however, Marco 
and Marcel clearly operate on the fringe of this experience by finding solutions to these 
dilemmas within participation in the right-wing movement.  Lack of authority, particularly 
when coupled with teen-angst-fueled identity crises, may lead youth to misbehave or stray 
from the expected norm.  More often than not, though, these same youth mature and develop 
out of these behaviors—but one must note the necessary resources that allow for this growth.   
Unlike most youth, Marco and Marcel grew up in a small, rural community plagued 
by a broken post-reunification infrastructure (both socially and economically) that lacked the 
requisite means to provide opportunities for healthy development of youth.  The most critical 
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component to maturation and positive development remains education, and both Marco and 
Marcel’s severe deficit in formal education gravely affected them.  Marcel completed 
schooling through the 8th grade at a Gesamtschule (14), fairing significantly better than his 
brother who attempted, but failed, to complete a number of apprenticeships in between 
various stints in jail.  Additionally, Veiel’s interviews with the Schönfeld parents reveal that 
both brothers suffered from developmental disabilities relating to speech early in childhood.  
Education encompasses not only classroom instruction, but also socialization critical to a 
child’s development.  Both Schönfeld brothers experienced a severely truncated education, 
consequently stunting their social development as well.  By failing to complete formal 
schooling, Marco and Marcel lacked the necessary cognitive ability to form meaningful 
relationships and develop their own identities in a healthy environment.   
The right-wing scene, even in its most superficial form, appeared to the Schönfeld 
brothers as a safe haven; however, one must note that it is precisely the superficiality of the 
outward right-wing identity that captivated Marco and Marcel.  Lower levels of education 
and economic standing places individuals, particularly youth, in a position where they remain 
unable to critically understand the significance of certain ideologies or communities, and the 
severity of participation therein.  As the anti-intellectuals, Marco and Marcel struggle to 
understand the more intellectual components of the right-wing movement, i.e. its specific 
political and ideological goals, and therefore latch onto tangible elements that evoke emotion 
within.  In essence, the Schönfeld brothers seek only a community with a clear identity to 
which they can viscerally respond and engage themselves most easily—no matter the level of 
superficiality.   
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 Unlike Marco and Marcel, the youth presented in Die Welle possessed all of the 
resources failing the Schönfeld brothers: middle- and upper-class upbringings, quality 
education, constructive social environments, involved parents, resource-rich communities, 
etc.  Tim remains the only outlier within the dynamic of Die Welle, and most resembles the 
Schönfeld brothers.  Unlike his peers, Tim holds no position of power or authority within the 
school’s social strata, receives no emotional support from his parents, and displays some 
atypical personality traits.  It should come as no surprise that Tim remains Die Welle’s only 
member who feels adamant attachment to the identity and ethos of the group, enough to end 
his own life.  Like Marco and Marcel, Tim falls prey to the tangible, visceral experience of 
belonging to a group, but fails to recognize the gravity of adopting that identity.  The 
question remains, however: does Tim kill himself out of mourning for the end of Die Welle, 
or in response to his own embarrassment?  After brandishing a gun and stating, “Die Welle 
lebt; die ist nicht tot,” (1:36:52), it appears that Tim remains only in denial about the end of 
the organization, and consequently the identity for which he sacrificed everything.  However, 
as he proceeds to kill a classmate and state, “Ich weiß, dass du mich immer verarscht hast!” 
(1:37:24), Tim directs the aim of his gun towards Rainer, who calmly states, “Dann gibt’s 
keinen Herr Wenger mehr, niemand, der die Welle führen kann” (1:38:00).  Tim’s rash 
suicide moments later proves that he, only in his final moments, recognized his own 
intellectual shortcomings in understanding that Die Welle started, and ended, simply as an 
experiment. 
If Der Kick functions as a Lehrstück über Gewalt, then Die Welle serves as its poetic, 
and dramatic prelude.  The film displays a clear degree of privilege on the part of Die 
Welle’s members, thus offering a narrow look at how radical groups form.  While Die Welle 
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clearly spirals out of control throughout the film, and ultimately projects radical behaviors à 
la the right-wing scene, the students only come to collectively understand the problematic 
nature of their group after Rainer intervenes.  While the students remain at fault for creating 
and propagating Die Welle, they remain comparatively more privileged than the Schönfeld 
brothers given their intellectual capacity to recognize their own behavior, in addition to the 
presence of an invested, concerned adult to critique said behavior.  Rainer’s final rally in 
support of Die Welle exists solely as a hyperbolic tool to prove the absurdity, and more 
importantly danger, of the group’s existence. 
Whereas the final scene of Die Welle appears more to the viewer as a concluding 
statement glorifying the radical-group experience of the school’s Projektwoche, Der Kick 
proves that these experiences must be viewed critically.  Despite its brutal nature, the murder 
of Marinus went unnoticed for days, and nothing was done to hold the Schönfeld brothers 
and their accomplice accountable for their reoccurring violent behavior.  Given the complete 
lack of parental authority, youth in Potzlow greatly required an adult figure like Rainer with 
the capacity to both recognize and terminate the sources of radical behavior.  After the 
murder of Marinus, Petra Freiberg, a social worker and director of Potzlow’s remaining 
Jugendclub, recognized that not enough action had been taken to actively counter and 
address extreme right-wing “tendencies” (221).  Freiberg assumed her position at the 
Jugendclub in 1997, five years before Marinus’ murder, and immediately sought to 
discourage youth interest in the right-wing scene:  
Wenn die rechten Jungedlichen im Club Nazi-MUsik aufdrehten, schritt sie ein. […] Kam 
jemand mit einem Nazi-T-shirt, forderte Petra Freiberg den Jugendlichen auf, nach Hause zu 
gehen und etwas anderes anzuziehen. Das gleiche gilt für Springerstiefel. […] Sie konnte 
auch mit ausgewachsenen Schlägertypen umgehen. […] Bei Prügeleien ertielte sie 
grundsätzlich Hausverbot. (222-3) 
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Despite exhibiting a clear commitment to bettering the environment for youth in Potzlow, 
Freiberg struggled to make any headway with some students, including Marcel Schönfeld, 
and recognized the fault of many parents’ inaction: “Ich kann nicht alles richten, was die 
Eltern seit Jahren nicht mehr im Griff haben!” (225).  Given the economic stress present in 
Potzlow, town officials and community members placed little emphasis on the importance of 
Freiberg’s youth development venture.  The overwhelming lack of accountability plagued the 
Potzlow community so severely that even the most necessary individual to better the 
community failed to receive adequate resources.  The more one learns of the communal 
experience in Potzlow, the more Marco and Marcel’s disturbing behavior seems predictable.  
Although Gansel’s film shows the ease with which youth can join radical movements, 
Veiel’s depiction of the Schönfeld brothers proves the severity of that involvement, further 
emphasizes the necessity for mechanisms that monitor individuals within radical movements, 
and aptly portrays the environments in which radical movements can grow and flourish.  
Der Kick and Die Welle present the pivotal role that education and socialization play 
in forming identities within radical movement.  While the Schönfeld brothers suffered from 
limited authority, education, resulting in weakened intellectual capacity, members of Die 
Welle benefitted from an abundance of resources that, in essence, saved them from 
themselves.  Both works depict a harrowing picture of how involvement within radical 
movements, particularly those of the right-wing, are inherently political, whether individuals 
involved chose to accept or understand those politics.  
Both Die Welle and Der Kick profile the experience of youth as they immerse 
themselves in radical, right-wing social scenes.  However, the two works distinguish 
themselves from one another by the conduits through which youth gain access to these 
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radical scenes: while the radicalism of Die Welle stems from establishing a highly structured 
social experience, youth profiled in Der Kick become engrossed in radicalism due to the lack 
of structure in their communities.  Ironically, in Die Welle, Rainer’s fun, relaxed approach to 
a class project produces an exclusive group characterized by a hierarchical and rigid 
infrastructure.  Conversely, in Der Kick, the lack of involved adults in a community already 
riddled with systemic societal blunders serves as the impetus for a youthful free-fall into 
radical behavior.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Understanding the Legacy of the NSDAP in Contemporary German Nationalism: 
Comparing the Realities of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in 
Party Literature and Timur Vermes’ Er ist wieder da (2012) 
 
Andres Veiel’s Der Kick excellently captures the identity crisis of the contemporary 
right-wing movement in Germany.  Marco and Marcel Schönfeld, as ambassadors of 
Germany’s new nationalism, present the troubling dichotomy of apolitical individuals 
involved in a highly political movement.  The right-wing movement cannot, and should not, 
be separated from its political origins, as well as its future political goals.  Although other 
right-wing political parties and interest groups exist in Germany, such as Die Republikaner, 
Die Rechte14, or the Deutsche Volksunion15,16, the most successful (and consequently well-
known) remains the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or the National Democratic 
Party of Germany (NPD). 
 As the only political party representing the far-right of center present in multiple state 
parliaments (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony), the NPD serves as the de facto 
political representative of the right-wing’s political objectives.  The NPD’s Parteiprogramm 
offers insight into the party’s goals in the form of the Grundgedanken: national identity, 
national sovereignty, national solidarity, the social nation state, and anti-globalization.17  
Consistent themes of nationalism, identity, and sovereignty prevail within the NPD’s 
platform, and present the party’s preferred archetype of German democracy.  In their opinion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 "Rechtsextremistische Parteien." Arbeitsfelder - Rechtsextremismus. Bundesamt Für Verfassungsschutz, n.d. 
Web. 24 Jan. 2014. <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-rechtsextremismus/zahlen-
und-fakten-rechtsextremismus/zuf-re-2012-parteien.html>. 
15 The Deutsche Volksunion existed as an autonomous party until 2011, at which point it merged with the NPD. 
16 Jansen, Frank. "Exklusiv: Fusion Von NPD Und DVU Ist Unwirksam." Rechtsextreme Parteien: Fusion Von
 NPD Und DVU Ist Unwirksam. Taggesspiegel Online, 27 Jan. 2011. Web. 22 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rechtsextreme-parteien-fusion-von-npd-und-dvu-ist 
unwirksam/3773068.html>. 
17 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), Arbeit, Familie, Vaterland: Das Parteiprogramm der
 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) (Bamberg: NPD, 2010), 5-6.  
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the NPD seeks to establish a democratic state grounded in nationalist ideals.  Nevertheless, 
critical review of the platform shows that the party does little to promote a democratic, i.e. 
socially egalitarian, state.  The party claims to be Germany’s native party (Heimatpartei) and 
emphasizes the importance of a national identity, and Germany remaining the country of 
Germans (“das Land der Deutschen”).18   
Given its nationalist ideology and interest in building a strong nation-state, the NPD 
also argues that Germany must maintain national sovereignty and freedom of action 
(Handlungsfreiheit) by withdrawing from supranational organizations.19 Explicit themes of 
xenophobia, and opposition towards supranational politics (i.e. European Union, North 
Atlantic Trade Organization, United Nations, etc.) and Germany’s role therein run rampant 
throughout NPD policies.  The party elaborates upon this opinion by stating that 
globalization poses a threat to German sovereignty, that the multicultural society has failed, 
and that Germans will slowly become a minority in their own country.20  The NPD maintains 
a perverse obsession with preservation of the German state, language, and culture, and 
repeatedly lambasts foreigners for not fitting into the “ideal” model of Germany.21  The 
party’s repeated stress on the importance of social equity (soziale Gerechtigkeit) for all 
Germans, and an economy that benefits the people,22 remains nebulous; clearly, the concept 
of “the people” refers only to individuals fulfilling the traditional archetype of a true German.  
The NPD’s emphasis on national identity and German sovereignty—specifically the 
party’s disdain for Germany’s international political involvement and non-ethnic Germans— 
serves as the perfect example of the party’s extreme right-wing views.  These topics pervade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), 5. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Ibid., 12. 
21 Ibid., 17. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
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every platform position, even those not directly related.  For example, in a section discussing 
the development of the middle class, the party explicitly says, “Eigentum an deutschem 
Grund und Boden kann nur von Deutschen erworben werden.”23  In other cases, the NPD 
explicitly addresses the role of foreigners in society (or lack thereof) vis-à-vis their 
Ausländerpolitik (an almost sarcastic play on the German word for foreign policy, 
Außenpolitik).  After detailing the incompetency of foreigners in the business and education 
sectors, the party states, “Grundsatz deutscher Ausländerpolitik ist: Rückkehrpflicht statt 
Bleiberecht.”24  The party later states that Islamization poses a threat to German identity and 
culture, and that neither Turkey nor Israel belong to Europe.25  Those carefully reading this 
element of NPD policy should notice the irony of equating Israel, the newfound home of the 
Jewish people after World War II, with Turkey, a secular republic rooted in Islamic tradition.  
While Israel remains hotly debated due to conflicting territories with Palestinian (i.e. 
Muslim) territories, the nation remains ostensibly the Jewish state.  To somehow include 
Israel, and consequently the Jewish people, within a larger “anti-terrorism, e.g. anti-Islam” 
narrative propagates fear and hatred of Judaism.  Although the original statement signifies a 
slight desire to veil the party’s anti-Semitism, the NPD clearly believes that Judaism, like 
Islam, does not belong to Europe, and has no right to exist therein.  The inclusion of 
seemingly tangential comments within the larger Ausländerpolitik platform signifies the 
party’s adamant propagation of a national German identity on the grounds of biological 
racism.   
Cultural preservation, including language pedagogy, remains a core aspect of the 
NPD’s platform, and signifies a specific desire for a German identity rooted in tradition.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), 9. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
25 Ibid., 13, 14. 
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party claims that the government holds responsibility for maintaining the cultural state of 
Germany, thus protecting it from threats of capitalism and globalization.26  Similarly, the 
NPD demands that the German language must receive constitutional recognition, due to the 
“mangelhaften Deutschkenntnissen” of foreigners.  Given their accusation against foreigners’ 
cultural incompetency, the NPD unsurprisingly rejects teaching foreign and German students 
together. 
Perhaps the most curious misappropriation of history in German politics stems from 
the NPD and other right-wing groups’ obsession with the Schuldkult, a concept referring to 
the collective guilt associated with the Nazivergangenheit (Nazi past).  The NPD argues that 
this obsession with guilt surrounding the events of World War II harms society, specifically 
youth, and emphasizes a “moralische Selbstvernichtung unserer Nation durch einseitige 
geschichtliche Schuldzuweisungen zu Lasten Deutschlands.”27 Unsurprisingly, the NPD 
sympathizes with the Nazi regime, arguing that Germany suffered extensively from Allied 
bombings and murder of millions of German civilians and prisoners of war.   
The NPD’s lack of political efficacy can be attributed to the party’s regressive policy 
favoring more traditional nationalist perspectives of German politics and society.  While they 
claim a definitive allegiance to fostering traditional German culture and society, the NPD 
arguably overgeneralizes ‘German tradition’ to reflect only the tradition of National 
Socialism.  The contemporary manifestation of a ‘traditional’ German identity serves to 
combat any affiliation with National Socialism, without fully disassociating from the 
ideologies of the movement.  The NPD’s curious interpretation of Germany’s wartime 
experience serves as fodder for critics to view the party as a neo-Nazi group.  Furthermore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), 17. 
27 Ibid., 14. 
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this form of tradition is not exclusive to any German identity, rather a uniquely radical neo-
conservative identity.  Nationalist ideologies often favor traditional pro-state perceptions of 
history; therefore, any declination of a specifically German tradition seems irrelevant. 
While the NPD may not explicitly express its support and admiration for National 
Socialism and the Nazi regime, the similarities in political goals and ideology shine clear to 
the average observer.  Nonetheless, the question remains: what is the legacy of Hitler’s 
NSDAP in the contemporary right-wing movement?  Timur Vermes’ satirical novel Er ist 
wieder da (2012) provides an equally hilarious and insightful answer to this curious question.  
As the title suggests, the novel details the fictitious experience of Hitler as he wakes up in the 
heart of Berlin in 2011, almost 70 years after the end of World War II, with no recollection 
that time has passed.  The former Führer explores the new capital but can only interpret his 
surroundings from a wartime understanding.  Due to his own disillusionment, coupled with 
an ardent need to prove to his status as the seminal leader of Germany, Hitler garners a large 
amount of attention from modern Germans.  However, while Hitler hopes to accrue more 
political advocates, he instead gains an audience of millennial-era Germans fixated on this 
newfound caricature of Germany’s former leader.  The vast majority of citizens with whom 
Hitler interacts believe him to be a comedian and method actor, and ultimately launch him 
into internet-celebrity by posting recordings of his overzealous behavior on YouTube. 
After garnering a following amongst Germans and spending more time in the ‘new’ 
German society, Hitler expresses his grave disappointment in a contemporary Germany 
defined by globalization and multiculturalism.  Hitler fears that he represents an anomaly of 
political competency in reestablishing the German nation state.  Although he soon learns of 
the NPD, Hitler bemoans “Dass es Monate brauchte, bis ich überhaupt mitbekam, dass es 
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jemanden gab, der sich berufen fühlte, die Arbeit der NSDAP fortzuführen” (260).  
Unfortunately, the Führer’s criticism of the NPD show no sign of disappearing, and Hitler 
summarizes his initial reaction to the party’s shabby headquarters in Berlin-Köpernick: “Ich 
hätte mich vor Ort am liebsten gleich übergeben” (260).   
Given the NPD’s boastful political ethos as Germany’s preeminent nationalist, 
traditionalist party, one would think that the party’s public persona would match; however, 
Hitler describes the party headquarters as “hoffnungslos überfordert” (261): 
“NPD-Parteizentrale” stand auf dem Klingelschild, so klein, dass man es Feigheit vor dem 
Feinde nennen musste. Es war unglaublich, es war wie in der Systemzeit: Der völkische 
Gedanke, die nationale Sache wurde erneut durch irgendwehlche Hohlköpfe entehrt, 
entwertet, lächerlich gemacht. […] Seit wann versteckt sich eine nationale Bewegung hinter 
derlei welschen Winkelzügen! (261) 
 
Although a comical description, Hitler’s initial impression of the party headquarters’ physical 
space reflects a clear misunderstanding of why one would fear embracing German 
nationalism, and how the contemporary nationalist party could not recognize their role in 
‘actively’ diminishing the previous efforts of the Nazi regime.  Upon entering the building, 
Hitler immediately notices the assortment of leaflets, brochures, and party platforms strewn 
about the office with “idiotischen Slogans [wie] ‘Gas geben’,” to which he exclaims, “Ich 
habe mich in meinem Leben noch nie derart für eine nationale Partei geschämt” (262).  If one 
were to err on the side of positivity, Hitler views the NPD as the less efficient, more 
mainstream palatable version of National Socialism; however, Hitler’s ardent embarrassment 
of the NPD reflects a deeper criticism of the party’s political efficacy and legitimacy.   
 As Hitler enters the NPD offices, he first interacts with a young man who 
immediately questions his claim to being Adolf Hitler.  Hitler asks, however, if he were the 
Hitler, would the young man pledge his allegiance to National Socialism, only to receive a 
stammering response from the young man.  Hitler offers a scathingly honest critique: “Nun 
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ja. Ich sehe in dieser Partei keine große Zukunft für Sie!” (265).  Although Vermes phrases 
this statement as a mere conversational aside, the reader recognizes that Hitler’s statement 
reflects his overarching belief that the party fails to continue the legacy of National 
Socialism, or embody the values of the NSDAP.  Even before engaging with party 
leadership, Hitler declares that in order to unite the national movement, any obtrusive 
“schädlichen Idioten” should be removed from the movement; however, he clarifies that the 
NPD represents “[der] Nest der schädlichen Idioten” (267). 
 As Hitler engages with party leadership, the conversation demonstrates significant 
differences between the attitudes and tendencies of the NSDAP and the NDP.  Holger Apfel, 
national chairman of the NPD, enthusiastically introduces himself to Hitler, who immediately 
criticizes him for not greeting him like an “anständiger Deutscher,” i.e. not utilizing the 
Hitlergruß (Hitler salute).  Hitler proceeds to question Apfel what the NPD has accomplished 
since National Socialism.  Apfel proudly details the party’s representation in two state 
parliaments and the active work of its Kameraden; however, Hitler immediately chastises the 
use of Kameraden, claiming it should refer only to “jemand, mit dem man im 
Schützengraben war” (268).  By distinguishing between Kamerad and his suggested term 
Volksgenossen, Hitler seeks to distinguish the Nazi tradition of combat from the 
nonviolent—and arguably weaker—methods of the NDP.  As Apfel attempts to explain that 
members of the NPD view themselves as national democrats, Hitler immediately interjects: 
“Nationaldemokratie”, spottete ich, “was soll das sein? Nationalsozialistische Politik 
erfordert einen Demokratiebegriff, der sich nicht für die Namensgebung eignet. Wenn mit der 
Wahl des Führers die Demokratie beendet ist, rennen Sie immer noch mit der Demokratie im 
Namen herum! Wie dumm kann man eigentlich sein?” 
 
Apfel attempts a quick retort to defend the party, but offers instead a perfectly succinct 
statement isolating the troubling nature of the NPD: “Wir stehen als Nationaldemokraten 
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natürlich fest auf dem Boden des Grundgesetzes und…” (269).  While the party clearly 
supports some ideological tenants of National Socialism, based both on their party platform 
and the actions of representatives and supporters, the party cannot forthrightly vocalize this 
support due to issues of German constitutionality.   
As Hitler indignantly asks Apfel if he has read ‘his’ book, i.e. Mein Kampf, Apfel 
fumbles through a politically correct answer: “Nun, man muss sich ja umfassend informieren, 
und obwohl das Buch in Deutschlnd nicht ganz leicht erhältlich ist…” (269).  Hitler, 
unimpressed with Apfel’s tenuous response, further prods Apfel to definitively answer, to 
which Apfel states only, “Also, das führt jetzt zu weit” and requests that the camera crew 
accompanying Hitler stop filming (269).  Clearly, Apfel has previously engaged with the 
ideological material of Hitler and the NSDAP, but cannot openly address the topic.  Apfel 
reiterates that the role of the NPD as national democrats, as opposed to only nationalists, 
exists exclusively due to the necessity of abiding by the guidelines of Grundgesetz, and lacks 
any earnestness otherwise.  The NPD repeatedly emphasizes the importance of fostering 
German tradition, and many assume that this notion includes the tradition of National 
Socialism and the NSDAP; however, the NPD fears an honest embrace of the Nazi tradition 
in public due to the political and legal implications.   
Nonetheless, Er ist wieder da perfectly suggests the irony that despite the better 
wishes of the party and its supporters, the NPD, and arguably the contemporary right-wing 
movement as a whole, fails to embody the ideals of the NSDAP.  As Hitler further speaks 
with Apfel about the NPD, he notes the lack of traditional tenants of National Socialism such 
as “Rassengedanke [und] der Gedanke des deutschen Blutes und der Blutreinheit” (270), a 
clear euphemistic homage to the Blut und Boden ideologies of the NSDAP.  Apfel fumbles in 
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forming a response, explaining the party’s position that German identity comes through birth 
and not citizenship acquisition (“nicht durch den Pass, sondern durch die Geburt”) (270).  
Unsatisfied with Apfel’s calculated response, Hitler once again restates his original 
sentinment: “Ein Deutscher windet sich nicht in juristischen Formulierungen, sondern er 
spricht Fraktur! Die Grundlage der Erhaltung des deutschen Volkes ist der Rassengedanke” 
(270-1).  Although Apfel’s response of an exclusively biological German identity does not 
differentiate much from Hitler’s concepts of Rassengedanke, Apfel’s hesitation in responding 
clearly originates from a fear of political incorrectness, and consequently unconstitutionality.   
Unimpressed with his introduction to the NPD by Apfel, Hitler exasperatedly states, 
“Es wundert mich nicht, dass diese Partei keinerlei Terror verbreitet” (271).  A clear rejection 
of the NPD’s methods further proves that in abiding by the new grounds of German 
constitutionality, the NPD has inadvertently distanced itself from the tradition of the NSDAP.  
As Hitler leaves the party headquarters, the press waiting outside ask about his affiliations 
with the NPD and Apfel, to which he disappointedly responds: “Ein Haufen Waschlappen. 
[…] Nur so viel: Ein anständiger Deutscher hat hier nichts verloren.” (272)   
Vermes’ presentation of the conversation between Hitler and Apfel essentially 
characterizes the NPD as the incompetent and ineffective would-be successor of the NSDAP 
in contemporary Germany.  Apfel’s muddled and obtuse responses pale in comparison to 
Hitler’s unmistakably stirring oratory, and thus present the NPD as entirely ineffectual.  
However, the literary portrayal of the NPD fails to highlight the party’s real-life emphasis on 
language and styled oratory.  In reality, Vermes’ analysis seems rather ironic; the language 
utilized in the NPD’s party platform, as well as by party representatives, bears great 
resemblance to that of the NSDAP. 
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By appropriating vocabulary most commonly associated with the NSDAP, the NPD 
effectively utilizes the Nazi experience as a descriptor of the party’s goals.  Unsurprisingly, 
language fitting of Nazi sympathy remains not only highly criticized, but also illegal in 
Germany.  Without directly referring to the ideology of the NSDAP, but rather allowing the 
NSDAP tradition to inspire a vague, albeit eerily similar political platform, the NPD 
positions itself as the victim of contemporary German democracy.  Under the title of 
“Deutschland der Deutschen,” the NPD outlines the detrimental influence of foreigners on 
contemporary German society.28   The ingenuous use of “foreigners” (Ausländer) 
overgeneralizes and further supports a political culture of “us vs. them” greatly favored by 
right-wing radicals (the NSDAP included).  
By exclaiming, “Die ‘multikulturelle’ Gesellschaft ist gescheitert!” and 
“Rückkehrpflicht statt Bleiberecht,” the NPD fully supports the basic tenant of the NSDAP: 
biological racism to ensure the purity of the state. As stated previously, the NPD mentions 
the importance of keeping Germany “das Land der Deutschen,” and promoting the party as 
Germany’s only Heimatpartei.29  Although Heimat in the most organic sense refers only to 
one’s national origin, it is important to emphasize the deep association of Heimat as a 
sociopolitical concept of the NSDAP.  Under National Socialism, The NSDAP encouraged 
Germans to embrace their Heimat, i.e. a simultaneously nationally and ethnically German 
identity, as a means of justifying the party’s goal of biological racism.  In conjunction with 
promoting a identity grounded in Heimat, the NPD argues that, “Integration ist Völkermord.”  
Although Völkermord can be used in a contemporary context, it harkens back to an age of 
victimization in which the NSDAP presented itself as the only feasible savior from outside 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), 12. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
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threats, be they political, religious, or otherwise.  Moreover, any critical analysis of the new 
right-wing movement easily reveals that societal homogeneity fails to ensure protection from 
Völkermord; Marcus and Marcel’s violence in Der Kick against an ostensibly ‘pure’ German 
proves that the right-wing movement remains reactionary as a means to justify a contrived 
victim narrative, regardless of which opposing actors are involved.  The NPD’s actions and 
Weltanschauung remain highly political due to this inevitable connection to National 
Socialism; moreover, the calculated use of language, specifically the appropriation of 
NSDAP vernacular, signifies the pivotal role of language within the new right-wing identity. 
In June 2010, the real-life Holger Apfel was removed from a plenary session of the 
Saxon State Parliament for outrageously anti-Semitic commentary.  As head of the Saxon 
NPD fraction at the time, Apfel spoke in support of the party’s proposed bill, “Keine 
Zusammenarbeit mit Schurkenstaaten—sächsisch-israelische Partnerschaft beenden.”30  
Apfel laced his presentation with epithets of Israel as a “jüdischen Terrorstaat,” and 
mentioning the “blühende Holocaust-Industrie.”  Although the sentiments behind Apfel’s 
commentary remain irrefutably clear, both his and the party’s use of exaggerated and 
accusatory language serve two purposes: first, to protect the NPD from being labeled as a 
neo-Nazi party, and therefore unconstitutional; secondly, to further support the party’s 
feeling of victimization at the hands of globalization. The concept of Schurkenstaaten 
villainizes the Israeli state as an attacker; moreover, any reference to the Holocaust as 
anything less than ethnic cleansing—nevertheless determining any post-World War II 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 "Eklat in Sachsen: NPD-Fraktionschef Muss Nach Antisemitischen Tiraden Landtag Verlassen." SPIEGEL
 ONLINE. SPIEGEL ONLINE GmbH, 17 June 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2013.
 <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/eklat-in-sachsen-npd-fraktionschef-muss-nach
 antisemitischen-tiraden-landtag-verlassen-a-701297.html>. 
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concern for the Holocaust as an “industry,” and therefore a fabricated truth—exhibits a clear 
agenda of racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism.   
Hitler’s amusing description of himself as an “anständiger Deutscher” serves two 
purposes: first, to distinguish the NSDAP from the NPD; secondly, to show that any 
“anständiger Deutcher” would, and should, not affiliate oneself with the NPD.  By indicating 
a difference between the actions of self-respecting German and the NPD, Vermes seeks to 
effectively delegitimize the NPD as a viable, legitimate political party in modern Germany.  
Moreover, any determination of the NPD as indecent or ludicrous simultaneously devalues 
the contemporary right-wing movement given the party’s role as de facto representative of 
the movement.  Vermes’ novel clearly represents a fictitious account, but it raises important 
questions in understand the viability of the NPD within the current political landscape in 
Germany. 
 The fact remains, however, that the NPD favors right-extremist ideology and 
activism; yet as a democratically elected party in two state parliaments, the NPD receives 
government funding, thus making the federal state an unintentional supporter of the party. 
While the party holds little power within their government positions, the NPD’s presence in 
two state parliaments, and the frequency of dialogue at the national level about the group 
indicates their role as the most significant minority party in Germany.  The party may 
resemble the NSDAP in some ways, but it certainly has crafted its own identity and 
ideologies separate from National Socialism; however, this difference does not mean that the 
NDP should be taken any less seriously.  Arguably any presence of such radical right-wing 
ideologies should be evaluated critically and approached cautiously.  Although the NPD does 
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not necessarily pose an immediate threat to German democracy, the fact that the party holds a 
significant regional and national presence implies its role in the German democratic question. 
The NPD’s passive support of radical ideologies remains the crux of the 
contemporary right-wing movement in Germany.  Questionable interpretation of German 
tradition, and possible links to ideology of National Socialism within contemporary NPD 
policies, leads major political parties and German citizens to question the constitutionality of 
the party.  The NPD has repeatedly denounced its position as a neo-Nazi party; however, the 
party platform indicates clear traces of xenophobia, national sovereignty, and biological 
racism.  Section 86 of the German criminal code (§ 86 Strafgesetzbuch) details the necessary 
regulation of “Verbreiten von Propagandamittel verfassungswidriger Organisationen.”31  
Specifically, the law outlines the following: 
(1) Wer Propagandamittel 
1. einer vom Bundesverfassungsgericht für verfassungswidrig erklärten Partei 
oder einer Partei oder Vereinigung, von der unanfechtbar festgestellt ist, daß 
sie Ersatzorganisation einer solchen Partei ist, 
 
2. einer Vereinigung, die unanfechtbar verboten ist, weil sie sich gegen 
dieverfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder gegen den Gedanken der 
Völkerverständigung richtet, oder von der unanfechtbar festgestellt ist, daß 
sie Ersatzorganisation einer solchen verbotenen Vereinigung ist, 
 
3. einer Regierung, Vereinigung oder Einrichtung außerhalb des räumlichen
 Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes, die für die Zwecke einer der in den
 Nummern 1 und 2 bezeichneten Parteien oder Vereinigungen tätig ist, oder 
 
4. Propagandamittel, die nach ihrem Inhalt dazu bestimmt sind, Bestrebungen 
einer ehemaligen nationalsozialistischen Organisation fortzusetzen, 
 
im Inland verbreitet oder zur Verbreitung im Inland oder Ausland herstellt, vorrätig hält, 
einführt oder ausführt oder in Datenspeichern öffentlich zugänglich macht, wird mit 
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Federal Republic of Germany. Bundesamt Für Verfassungschutz. Symbole Und Zeichen Der
 Rechtsextremisten. Bundesamt Für Verfassungsschutz, n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2014.
 <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/broschuere-2013-05-symbole-und-zeichen-der
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The documentation provided by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz outlining § 86 StGb 
provides a comprehensive visual guide to various symbols and icons associated with previous 
political parties, organizing groups, gangs, and other bodies associated with nationalism and 
radical right-wing activity.  Similarly, under § 86 StGb, the list recognizes the dates by which 
the government outlawed certain groups and organizations—some as recently as 2009.32,33 
While the NPD does not meet the entire criterion mentioned above, one should not 
ignore the critical element of the fourth subsection: content aspiring to continue that of a 
former national socialist organization.  Undoubtedly the NPD shares many values with the 
NSDAP, as well as others organizations listed throughout the document.  Moreover, given 
that the government banned many of the organizations in the late 1990s and early 2000s—at 
which time the NDP gained, and sustained, a markedly higher percentage of national- and 
state-level support—the question remains what makes the NPD more constitutional than 
other radical right-wing groups. 
The anti-Semitic nature of the NPD’s aforementioned bill in the Saxon State 
Parliament, in addition to Apfel’s speech, indicate a farfetched, albeit a deeply held, 
contempt within the party towards foreigners, specifically the Jewish people.  The NPD has 
an extensive, albeit hazy, history of work with underground terrorist cells, attending and 
supporting neo-Nazi rallies, and making explicit anti-Semitic and xenophobic statements.  In 
2012, the German government compiled a 1,147 page master document containing 3,051 
examples of extremist behavior from the NPD that ultimately encouraged the most recent 
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33 "Verbotene Organisationen." Arbeitsfelder - Rechtsextremismus. Bundesamt Für Verfassungsschutz, n.d.
 Web. 24 Jan. 2014. <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-rechtsextremismus/zahlen
 und-fakten-rechtsextremismus/zuf-re-2012-parteien.html>. 
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attempt to ban the party.34  The document calls into question the extent to which the 
Grundgesetz protects the party within German democratic order; ironic, given that the NPD 
fervently opposes the Grundgesetz.  While the mainstream German Left (specifically Die 
Linke and SPD) favor banning the party, the CDU often appears slightly more reticent.  
Many critics claim that this hesitation forcibly aligns the CDU closer to the NPD and right-
wing parties; however, it seems to represent more an appreciation for personal freedoms and 
commitment to the Grundgesetz. 
 Overall, German public opinion remains mixed on whether or not banning the NPD 
serves as a viable solution; as of 2011, between 67 and 70 percent of Germans polled stood in 
favor of a ban, while approximately 22 stood in opposition.35,36  However, in discussing the 
possibility of banning the NPD, one must also carefully consider the reasoning for furthering 
such a ban.  Some Germans support banning the NPD on the grounds of unconstitutionality 
given the party’s clear adoption of many elements of National Socialism.  Presumably the 
assumption therein remains that banning the NPD will help eradicate lingering elements of 
National Socialism in contemporary German society.  However, banning the NPD under 
these circumstances fails to address the myriad of other complex elements of the right-wing 
movement, such as violence and apolitical involvement in a highly political movement.  The 
continued existence of the NPD in light of numerous others bans of right-wing parties and 
organizations easily supports the argument that a ban will lead only to the reestablishment of 
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 -right-npd-party-a-853564.html>. 
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another comparably nationalist group.  Consequently, any ban of the NPD would likely prove 
more problematic than helpful. 
 The unmistakably violent tendencies of the radical right-wing cannot, and should not, 
be ignored, particularly when discussing the constitutionality and possible banning of groups 
like the NPD.  Events such as the Hoyerswerda riots (1991), Dönermörder caused by the 
National Socialist Underground (2000-2006), Berlin-Hellersdorf riots (2013), as well as the 
murder of Marinus in Der Kick, and the trauma of Die Welle, prove that regardless of 
government bans or commitment to Verfassungschutz, radical right-wing groups and 
individuals exist in Germany.  By criminalizing the outward manifestation of far-right 
ideologies, the German government has practically encouraged the right-wing movement to 
evade the law.  While right-wing groups might support the platforms of outlawed groups—or 
more obviously, National Socialism—they have discovered the necessary tool of omission to 
ensure that the party can exist within the legal, constitutional framework of German 
democracy.  By maneuvering through the bureaucracy of constitutionality, right-wing groups 
maintain their radical ideologies, and continue to grow and garner support from the German 
public.  However, it remains imperative to avoid the inclination to ban any and all radical 
groups or political parties with the goal of a weakened right-wing movement.  Conversely, a 
constitutional ban would only push the right-wing movement underground, thus making it 
more elusive, incapable of regulation, and consequently more dangerous. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The contemporary German right-wing movement experienced a resurgence of support 
during the post-reunification period, yielding representatives from the NPD in two state 
parliaments in the early 2000s.  However, despite maintaining seats within both state 
parliaments, the NPD faces dwindling membership numbers37 and on-again, off-again public 
support for a constitutional ban of the party.  While the story of the NPD reflects a 
presumably waning interest in the party at the grassroots level, support for the overarching 
community of the far-right-wing continues, with over 23,000 members across Germany in 
2012 (this figure includes neo-Nazis, established members of right-wing parties, and 
“subkulturell geprägte Rechtsextremisten”).38  In addition, one would be remiss in not 
mentioning the 9,600 supporters of gewaltbereiten Rechtsextremisten, i.e. individuals within 
the larger right-wing movement in support of a specifically violent approach to right-wing 
ideology.39  Despite a slight decrease from 9,800 supporters since 2011, the Bundesamt für 
Verfassungschutz highlights the frightening statistic that, in theory, almost every other right-
winger supports violent ideology.  Although the far-right-wing community encompasses less 
than one percent of Germany’s overall population, it remains an incredibly vocal minority in 
local, state, and national politics with far-reaching cultural and societal implications.   
While no solution presently exists to effectively rid Germany of its far-right-wing 
movement, Germans must ardently target communities susceptible to extremism; however, 
the difficulty remains that such behaviors can exist in a variety of environments.  Whereas 	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 Bundesamt Für Verfassungsschutz, n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2014.
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Die Welle depicts the experience of middle class, educated youth, and Der Kick profiles 
rural, low-income, uneducated young adults, both present the ways in which the extremist 
nature of the far-right offers participants a sense of communal identity.  However, the reality 
of Der Kick offers practical advice for evaluating the role the far-right plays in community 
building.  Unlike Die Welle, which portrays a fictional experience, the legitimate brutality 
and drama of the far-right within the Potzlow community encourages a sort of populist 
thinking that only further disadvantages an already troubled town (both economically and 
socially).  
Die Welle and Der Kick both serve as prime case studies for the right-wing 
experience; however, the history of the NPD and its current role in German politics signifies 
the real, ongoing problem of the far-right.  In early May 2013, the now infamous trial of the 
Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground, NSU), a radical, far-
right-wing terrorist organization, renewed public interest in the possible threat of the right-
wing movement.  Although the trial is ongoing, the Higher Regional Court in Bavaria 
charged Beate Zschäpe, the only remaining member of the NSU, with direct involvement in 
ten murders committed between 2000-2006, most of which are believed to have been 
racially-motivated.40  In addition, German politicians have revived the debate surrounding 
formally banning the NPD party in light of recent political developments.41,42  Regardless of 
whether support for the far-right increases or decreases (though it does appear to be 
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declining), observers must remain cognizant of the deep seeded dangers of extremist 
ideologies.  Small and destructive political parties and/or community organizations with 
dangerous goals must be taken seriously, no matter how small.  Should the state fail to 
recognize the severity of these cases, thus providing ample growth opportunity in between, 
they further implicate themselves in allowing for radical movements to grow.  The 
historically violent track record of organizations affiliated with the far-right should no longer 
be viewed as isolated, spontaneous events; undoubtedly, a network exists within 
contemporary Germany to continuously allow for far-right extremism.  
Given the constantly changing landscape of German politics, it remains to be seen 
how mainstream political parties, as well as the German citizenry as whole, will choose to 
engage with the far-right-wing movement.  Despite appearing initially practical, a ban of the 
NPD with the intention of eradicating nationalistic ideologies will compromise the overall 
wellbeing of German society and politics by furthering marginalizing radical demographics; 
undoubtedly, such an absolutist solution would only result in an increasingly violent and 
underground right-wing scene.  On the final page of its publication Symbole und Zeichen der 
Rechtsextremisten, the Bundestamt für Verfassungschutz writes, “Unsere Demokratie ist 
wehrhaft. Deshalb: Verfassungsschutz.” 43  This oddly poetic conclusion to an otherwise 
straightforward, informational document reveals the ardent desire of the German government 
to prevent radical right-wing ideologies from infiltrating mainstream German society. 
However, as Germans continue to define what it means to be German, it remains 
imperative to look at all elements of the Republic, even blemishes such as the far-right-wing 
movement, to ensure the stability of German democracy.  While pushing extremism out of 
the mainstream (and consequently into the impenetrable underground) appears to be a simple 	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solution, rarely do large problems call for small answers.  Bertolt Brecht wrote in Der 
Dreigroschen Oper of divergent social strata:   
  Denn die einen sind im Dunkeln 
  Und die andern sind im Licht. 
  Und man siehet die im Lichte 
  Die im Dunkeln sieht man nicht. 
 
By raising awareness of the far-right-wing and encouraging education on the significance of 
such political identities, Germany will sustain a healthy democratic state, and keep the most 
dangerous out of the dark.  
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